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Most colleges and universities of all sizes have an 
endowment, a fund that provides a stream of income and 
maintains the corpus of the fund in perpetuity. Organizations 
with large endowments, such as colleges, universities, and 
private foundations, all finance a significant part of their 
operations through the return received from the investment of 
this capital. This article examines the legal framework for 
endowment investing, endowment investing policies, their 
evolution to more sophisticated and riskier strategies, and the 
consequences evinced during the financial crisis of 2008 and 
beyond. It traces the approaches to endowment investing and 
chronicles the rise and, if not the fall, the challenges to modern 
portfolio management. It examines the impact of endowment 
losses on colleges and universities and their constituencies, as 
well as the problem of trustee deference to boards' investment 
committees. This article concludes that universities have 
learned little from the financial crisis and are more invested in 
illiquid, nontransparent assets than before the financial crisis. 
Finally, this article recommends the establishment of board. 
level risk management committees to evaluate endowment 
investing policies. 
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INTRODUCTION
Most colleges and universities of all sizes have an endowment, a fund 
that provides a stream of income and maintains the corpus of the fund in 
perpetuity.1 Organizations with large endowments, such as colleges, 
universities, and private foundations,2 all finance a significant part of their 
1. The legal definition of an endowment fund is an institutional fund or part 
thereof, not expendable by the institution on a current basis under the terms of the 
applicable gift investment. NAT’L CONF. ON COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF.
PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(2) (2006) [hereinafter UPMIFA].
However, the word “endowment” generally is used in a broader sense than just the 
permanent corpus of the fund. Quasi-endowment is a term that describes unrestricted 
capital gifts that the charitable institution has decided to treat as endowment. 
Endowment funds are contrasted to other types of funds, such as tuition revenues, 
which are held for a very short term and are likely to be invested in treasury bills or 
commercial paper. Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College, 
University, Foundation Decisions on Annual Spending from Endowments: A Visit to the 
World of Spending Rules, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 51 n.4 (1993).
Accounting classifications of endowments differ. Permanent or classic endowment 
funds are restricted in their purposes by donors to provide long term funding for 
designated purposes. Endowments of Not-for-Profit Organizations: Net Asset 
Classification of Funds Subject to an Enacted Version of the Uniform Prudent 
Management of Institutional Funds Act, and Enhanced Disclosures for All Endowment 
Funds, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
2008). Unrestricted net assets are not subject to donor-imposed restrictions. Id.
Temporarily restricted net assets consist of donor-restricted endowment funds that are 
not classified as permanently restricted net assets. Id. When donor restrictions expire–a 
stipulated time restriction ends or a purpose restriction is fulfilled–temporarily 
restricted net assets are reclassified to unrestricted net assets and reported as net assets 
released from restrictions. Id. The restrictive spending policies of UPMIFA would 
apply only to true endowments with restrictions. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 2(2). All 
types of endowment categories are commingled for investment purposes and are 
referred to as “endowment.” Id. At Harvard in the fiscal year 2013, 64.7% of the 
endowment is classified for accounting purposes as temporarily restricted; 18.1% as 
permanently restricted; and 17.1% as unrestricted. HARVARD UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL 
REPORT FISCAL 2013 18 (2013), available at http://vpf-
web.harvard.edu/annualfinancial /pdfs/2013fullreport.pdf. Yale’s figures in the fiscal 
year 2013 were 69.8% temporarily restricted; 15.2% permanently restricted; and 14.9% 
unrestricted. YALE FINANCIAL REPORT 2012-2013 15 (2013), available at
www.yale.edu/finance /controller/reporting/reports.html.
2. Private foundations are charities that have failed certain tests of public support 
under I.R.C. § 509 (2012). For the 2009 tax year, 92,624 domestic private foundations 
reported $585.5 billion in total assets. Cynthia Belmonte, Domestic Private 
Foundations and Related Excise Taxes, Tax Year 2009, STAT. OF INCOME BULL.,
Winter 2013, at 115 Fig. A. Private foundations typically are funded through a gift of 
assets that becomes an endowment, and grants are paid out of the earnings generated. 
I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1) requires private foundations to spend at least 5% of their current 
investment asset value for charitable purposes. I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1) (2012).
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operations through the return received from the investment of this capital. 
This article examines the legal framework for endowment investing, 
endowment investing policies, their evolution to more sophisticated and 
riskier strategies, and the consequences evinced during the financial crisis 
of 2008 and beyond. It does not deal, save tangentially, with issues of 
endowment spending policies, which have been matters of widespread 
commentary and disagreement.3
The article suggests procedures and policies to encourage college and 
university board practices that may better inform trustees of investment 
approaches and, in some cases, restrain investment strategies that increase 
the volatility of endowment returns. It is recommended that endowments 
invest with more awareness and consider more realistically the possibility 
of volatile negative returns, and their impact on the college or university, 
its beneficiaries, and the communities it affects.
I. AN OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE OF ENDOWMENTS
The world of endowments is highly stratified in terms of size, utilization 
of modern theories of finance, trustee governance procedures, and 
delegation to and reliance on outside experts. The endowments discussed 
herein have been artificially divided into two categories. First are the 
largest and most sophisticated endowments, those with assets over $1 
billion, which utilize the most modern tools of finance.4 Second are 
3. See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 96-109 (2010); RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, § 18.5 (7th ed. 2007); Evelyn Brody, 
Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 
725 (1999); Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of 
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997); Peter Conti-Brown, Scarcity Amidst Wealth: 
The Law, Finance, and Culture of Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis, 63
STAN. L. REV. 699, 741–43 (2011); Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have 
Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUDIES 3, 40 (1990); Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming 
Showdown Over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
1795 (2009); Daniel Halperin, Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?, 67 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 17 (2011); Daniel Halperin, Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized? 
(Part II), 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 125 (2011); Calvin H. Johnson, Payout by 
Charities Over 50 Years, 132 TAX NOTES 1161 (Sept. 12, 2011); Akash Deep and Peter 
Frumkin, The Foundation Payout Puzzle (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working 
Paper No. 9, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com /abstract=301826. From the political 
world, Senator Charles Grassley has weighed in by supporting a 5 % mandatory payout 
of educational endowments to reduce the high costs of tuition and improve access to 
the middle class and poor. See Karen W. Arenson, Big Spender, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 
2008), http: 
//query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02EED91E3DF933A15757C0A96E9C8
B63&ref=karenwarenson.
4. In 2007, there were seventy-six endowments with $1 billion in assets and 
sixty-five endowments with assets from $500 million to $999,999,999. NAT. ASS’N OF 
COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2007 NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF 
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endowments with assets from $500 million to $1 billion that have adopted 
modern portfolio theories of investing, but generally may not have taken on 
the same level of risk in their investment strategies, nor have they had 
access to the most successful hedge funds, private equity firms, or 
investment advisors, or garnered the gains or suffered the losses of the 
largest endowments.
Intergenerational equity is the most commonly stated goal for
endowment management. As stated by James Tobin: “The trustees of an 
endowment institution are the guardians of the future against the claims of 
the present. Their task is to preserve equity among generations.”5 This 
means that tomorrow’s students, scientists, patients, beneficiaries, or 
parishioners will receive the same or greater benefits, taking into account 
the effects of inflation, as today’s beneficiaries. Another common rationale 
for endowments is that they enable organizations to smooth out revenue
shortfalls, so that they can maintain the same scale of activities in lean 
years as in bountiful ones.6
The financial crisis of 2008 called into question both rationales. Colleges 
and universities did not increase their spending rates to smooth out the 
endowment spending shortfalls, and budget cutbacks were so severe at 
many educational institutions that intergenerational equity for current 
students or beneficiaries was not maintained.7
It is difficult to find hard figures of the size of endowment funds in the 
ENDOWMENTS (2007) [hereinafter 2007 NCSE]. In 2009, there were only fifty-six 
endowments with $1 billion in assets and sixty-five endowments with assets from $500 
million to $999,999,999. NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2009
NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NCSE]. In 
2012, seventy-one endowments had $1 billion in assets, and seventy-three had assets 
from $500 million to $999,999,999. NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS,
20012 NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2012) [hereinafter 2012 
NCSE]. These figures include Canadian institutions. NACUBO-Commonfund figures 
often differ from an institution’s own report of endowment results.
5. James Tobin, What is Permanent Endowment Income?, 64 AMER. ECON. REV.
427 (1974). Professor Tobin was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 
1981.
6. Robert C. Merton, Optimal Investment Strategies for University Endowment 
Funds, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION 211, 211–12 
(Charles T. Cotfelter & Michael Rothschild eds. 1993); Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 
708–09. Another view, offered by Professor Henry Hansmann, is that justifications of 
intergenerational equity are not persuasive and may not call for a transfer of wealth 
through saving from the present generation to spend on later ones. The argument for 
endowment accumulation should be on grounds of efficiency. Professor Hansmann 
suggests that the more compelling reasons for endowments are serving as a financial 
buffer against periods of financial adversity; helping to assure long term survival of an 
institution’s reputational capital; protecting intellectual freedom; and transmitting 
prized values. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 14, 39.
7. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 702–03.
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United States, but the sum is immense.8 In the period from 2001 to 2007, 
higher education endowments grew annually by double digit figures led by 
Harvard’s endowment, which ballooned from a little over $5 billion in 
1993 to $36.6 billion at the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008. Yale’s
endowment grew from $3.1 billion to $22.9 billion in that period.
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, higher education endowments 
lost three percent of their value in a difficult financial environment. Then 
the bottom dropped out. The nation’s most severe financial crisis since the 
Great Depression occurred in fall 2008.9 This event wreaked havoc on 
endowment portfolios. By the end of the 2009 fiscal year, Harvard’s
endowment was $25.7 billion (down 36.6% from the previous year), 
followed by Yale’s at $16.3 billion (down 28.6%), and Stanford’s at $12.6 
billion (down 26.7%).10 A survey of over 800 higher education institutions 
showed losses on average of 18.7%, the worst rate of return since the Great 
Depression.11
Colleges and universities with the largest endowments (over $1 billion) 
lost more on average (20.5%) than smaller ones because of their 
concentration in sophisticated investment strategies—so called alternative 
assets—such as private equity and venture capital investments,12 real estate, 
and commodities, which involved more short-term risk and were illiquid.13
8. The 2012 NCSE for the 2012 fiscal year ending June 30 found that 831 
institutions consisting of 525 private colleges and university endowments in addition to 
306 public education institutional endowments had $406.1 billion in assets. 2012 
NCSE, supra note 4. These figures are only part of the total. Figures for endowment 
results are from the NCSE Report for the particular year mentioned.
9. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT XV (Jan. 2011).
10. Tamar Lewin, Investment Losses Cause Steep Dip in University Endowments, 
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/201 
0/01/28/education/28endow.h tml?_r=0. Although the declines were the greatest since 
the Depression, those endowments had only fallen to their 2005 levels, and they had 
positive returns over the ten years ending on June 30, 2009.
11. Kenneth E. Redd, To Ensure We Endure, BUSINESS OFFICER, July/August 
2012, available at  http://www.nacubo.org/Business_Officer_Magazine/Magazine_
Archives/JulyAugust_2012/To_Ensure_We_Endure.html.
12. Private equity consists of investments in companies, which may be held long 
term as the firms add value or leveraged buyouts of public companies. Venture capital 
involves an investment in a start-up company, which if it issues an initial public 
offering of securities will generate a substantial profit to investors. For example, the 
Yale endowment’s $300,000 investment in Google produced $75 million in gains when 
the company went public in 2004. THE YALE ENDOWMENT 2010 19 (2010) [hereinafter 
YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2010], available at http://www. 
yale.edu/investments/Yale_Endowment_10.pdf. Investments in private equity or 
venture capital are typically structured as partnerships with hedge funds.
13. Despite the great recession, large endowments had better returns than 
benchmark results such as the Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) 500 and smaller 
endowments. In 2008, the S&P 500 declined 38.5%, the most since a 38.6%decline in 
1937. Elizabeth Stanton, U.S. Stocks Post Steepest Yearly Decline Since Great 
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Endowments of foundations, healthcare, social service, and cultural 
institutions were similarly affected.14 Endowment performance recovered 
in the fiscal years 2010 and 2011, faltered in 2012, and rose in 2013.15
However, the levels of 2007 have not been reached.
Large endowment institutions often fund thirty-five percent or more of 
Depression, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 31, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news archive&sid=a5RkfQG30k 1k. 
Yale’s ten-year return from 2002 to 2012 was 10.6% per annum, adding $8.89 billion 
to the endowment, including the disastrous decline in 2008. Its twenty year return was 
13.7% per annum adding $15.8 billion in value. THE YALE ENDOWMENT 2012 32
(2012) [hereinafter YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2012],  available at
http://investments.yale.edu/images/documents/Yale_Endow ment_12.pdf. Harvard’s
endowment averaged 9.49% over ten years and 12.29% over twenty years. JANE L.
MENDILLO, HARVARD MANAGEMENT COMPANY ENDOWMENT REPORT, MESSAGE FROM 
THE CEO (2012), available at http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/docs/
Final_Annual_Report_201 2.pdf.
The average ten-year return in 2012 for all educational endowments net of fees
was 6.2%. 2012 NCSE, supra note 4, at 3. The average ten-year return for all 
endowments in 2009 was 4%. Goldie Blumenstyk, Average Return on Endowment 
Investments Is Worst in Almost 40 Years, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan 28, 2010), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Average-Return-on-Endowment/63762/. For the fiscal year 
2009, the five largest university endowments declined by 25% to 30%. Craig Karmin, 
Ivy League Endowments Finally ‘Dumb’, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB12463183415797 0855. According to a survey 
by the Northern Trust Corp, the median loss of endowments with less than $100 
million in assets that same year was 16%.  Id. Presumably smaller endowments had a 
more traditional asset allocation, including more old fashioned fixed income. Id.
14. An annual survey by the Chronicle of Philanthropy of 221 private foundations 
and sixty-nine community foundations found that endowments dropped by 26% in the 
calendar year 2008. Caroline Preston, Foundation Endowments Dipped in 2008, but 
Giving Rose, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (July 2, 2009), 
http://philanthropy.com/article/Foundation-Endowments-Dipped/6311 7/.
15. In the fiscal year 2012, the average investment return of educational 
endowments was 0.3% compared to 19.2% in the fiscal year 2011, 11.9% in 2010, and 
18.7% in 2009. See 2009 NCSE, supra note 4; NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS.
OFFICERS, 2010 NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2009) [hereinafter 
2010 NCSE]; NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2011 NACUBO-
COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS(2011) [hereinafter 2011 NCSE]; 2012 NCSE 
supra note 4; Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Coll. and Univ. Bus. Officers, Educational 
Endowments Returned an Average of -.3% in FY 2012, Down Sharply from 19.2% in 
FY2011 (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://www.nacubo.org/Research/
NACUBO_Endowment_Study.html. Preliminary data from the NACUBO-
Commonfund survey for the fiscal year 2013 indicates that investment returns for all 
college and university endowments averaged 11.7% due to the strength of the equity 
markets. Endowments with assets over $1 billion posted an average investment return 
of 11.6%, and endowments with assets between $501 million to $1 billion had average 
returns of 12.9% due to greater allocation to equities compared to alternative 
investments. Press Release, Nat’t Ass’n of Coll. and Univ. Bus. Officers, Preliminary 
Data Indicate Educational Endowments Earned Investment Returns Averaging 11.7%
(Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/
2013NCSEPreliminaryPressRelease.pdf.
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their operating budget through the endowment’s payout.16 In response to 
the asset declines of 2008, colleges, universities, museums, and other 
charities froze or delayed construction and expansion projects, cut 
operating budgets, drew on cash reserves, implemented hiring and salary 
freezes, and ordered layoffs.17 A few sued their financial advisors.18 Many 
colleges and universities struggled to preserve financial aid. Several 
institutions, including Harvard, issued bonds to raise money for expenses 
or to allow them to hold on to illiquid assets until their price rose.19 Rating 
services cut university credit ratings. On top of this, charitable giving in 
education and elsewhere declined as a result of the financial crisis.20 This 
following discussion explores what went wrong and why it may occur 
again.
16. See MENDILLO, supra note 13, at 3; HARVARD UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL 
REPORT FISCAL 2013, supra note 1, at 6 (35% budget); YALE ENDOWMENT 2010, supra 
note 12 (41.3% budget); YALE ENDOWMENT 2012, supra note 12, at 4 (36% budget). 
The most common measure of endowments is their dollar asset value. There are other 
measures such as endowment to expense ratios and endowment per full-time enrolled 
student. The endowment-to-expense ratio acknowledges that the strength of an 
endowment depends on the extent to which it can pay for institutional activities. Sarah 
Waldeck believes the endowment-to-expense ratio is the most sophisticated measure 
available to policymakers because it compares the endowment to an institution’s actual 
costs and acknowledges that some schools are more expensive to operate than others. 
The endowment per full-time enrolled student also recognizes that some schools are 
more expensive to run than others but instead of using actual costs, the measure relies 
on the number of full-time students as a rough proxy for institutional expenses. See
Waldeck, supra note 3, at 1799–1802.
17. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at Appendix B for an elaboration of the 
layoffs and cutbacks by the institutions with the five largest endowments. For the 
impact on the six Boston area institutions, see Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus 
Institute, Educational Endowments and the Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic 
Risks in the Shadow Banking System 55–56 (2011), [hereinafter Tellus Report], 
available at http://www.tellus.org/publications/files/endowmentcrisis. pdf.
18. Conti-Brown, supra note 3.
19. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 37–38.
20. Charitable contributions to higher education declined 57% on an inflation 
adjusted basis in 2008 compared to the previous year, the largest percentage drop in 
fifty years, and in the fiscal year 2009, giving to colleges dropped 11.9%.  Kathryn 
Masterson, Private Giving to Colleges Dropped Sharply in 2009, THE CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Feb, 3, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Private-Giving-to-Colleges/63879/;
Stephanie Strom, Charitable Giving Declines, a New Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 2009, at A16; Matthew Kaminski, The Age of Diminishing Endowments, WALL ST.
J., June 6-7, 2009, at A11; In fiscal year 2010, giving to colleges and universities 
increased 0.5%, but on an inflation adjusted basis decline 0.6%. Press Release, Council 
for Aid to Educ., Colleges and Universities Raise 28 Billion in 2010, Same Total as 
2006 (Feb. 2, 2011). According to the Voluntary Support of Education Survey, 
conducted by the Council for Aid to Education (CAE), charitable contributions to 
American colleges and universities increased 2.3% in 2012 to $31 billion, but the total 
is still below 2008’s historical high of $31.6 billion. Press Release, CAE, Colleges and 
Universities Raise $31 Billion in 2012 (Feb. 20, 2013).Adjusting for inflation, giving is 
virtually unchanged, inching up just 0.2%. Id.
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II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO ENDOWMENT INVESTING
Initially, endowments were gifts of property given to institutions to 
provide them with a source of dependable income from rents or interest.21
Growth was achieved primarily through additional gifts, and endowment 
funds were invested quite conservatively. English law encouraged this 
approach. There were legal lists of securities, principally governmental 
securities, which were presumably safe investments in which trustees could 
invest.22
In 1830, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the 
English rule because there were few government securities available, and 
they were not necessarily safe.23 The court then enunciated the prudent 
person rule:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall 
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is 
to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence 
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in 
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering 
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital 
to be invested.24
The court concluded that the trustees acted according to their best skill 
and discretion.25 The prudent person rule meant that no security per se was 
21. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 17.
22. BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT 
MAN RULE 11 (1986).
23. Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830). In Amory, the trustees of 
Harvard College were directed by the terms of a $50,000 testamentary trust of John 
M’Lean to “loan the same upon ample and sufficient security or to invest the same in 
safe and productive stock either in the public funds, bank shares of other stock, 
according to their best judgment and discretion” paying the income to the testator’s
wife for her lifetime and thereafter to deliver the principal to Harvard College and 
Massachusetts General Hospital in equal shares to be held by them and used to further 
their charitable purposes. Id.
The trustees invested in several bank and insurance stocks as well as those of two 
manufacturing companies which declined in value. Id. The two charitable 
remaindermen, Harvard and Mass. General, sought to surcharge the trustees for the 
reduction in value of the insurance and manufacturing stocks which had declined from 
$41,000 to $29,000, on the ground that they were not proper trust investments. Id. This 
was the English rule at the time. Justice Putnam, who delivered the opinion of the 
court, rejected the reasoning behind the English rule as having “very little or no 
application” to American trust law because American government securities were both 
exceedingly limited in amount compared to the amount of trust funds to be invested 
and in any event not necessarily a safe investment. Id. at 460. Additionally, investments 
in private corporations were subject to suit by law whereas the government could only 
be supplicated. Id. at 461.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 463.
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inappropriate, but the rule was interpreted restrictively. Some jurisdictions 
continued the “legal list” approach.26
Endowment managers spent quite conservatively. The “income” (e.g., 
dividends, interest, rent, and royalties) generated by an endowment could 
be currently expended, but the principal of the fund remained inviolate.27 In 
the nineteenth century, trustees invested in fixed-income securities, such as 
Treasury notes and secured corporate bonds while maintaining up to one 
third of their portfolios in real estate and mortgages.28 Investment practices 
changed at some institutions after the First World War. In the 1920s, as the 
stock market rose, many endowments invested in high yielding bonds and 
common stocks. The experience of the Yale endowment is illustrative. 
During the 1920s, the Yale endowment invested over one half of its assets 
in equities.29 In 1930, equities represented forty-two percent of the Yale 
endowment portfolio, whereas the average college or university had only 
eleven percent.30
The Great Depression led to a more sober approach. In the late 1930s, 
Yale’s treasurer decided the share of equities in Yale’s portfolio should be 
reduced.31 He introduced an investing template that lasted three decades: at 
least two dollars would be held in fixed income instruments for every 
26. See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869) (prohibiting investment in stocks). The 
prudent person rule was interpreted conservatively because courts tended to look at 
investment decisions on the basis of hindsight. If an investment decision turned out 
badly, courts often concluded that the original decision was bad. In re Chamberlain’s
Estate, 156 A. 42 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931) is an example. A testator died in August 1929, 
two months before the market crash that ushered in the Great Depression. Between his 
death and the court hearing on the estate, the estate’s value had declined from $258,000 
to less than $200,000. The bulk of its corpus was in securities listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange. With breathtaking hindsight clarity, the court stated:
It was common knowledge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies, 
but the general public as well, that the stock market condition was an 
unhealthy one, that values were very much inflated, and that a crash was 
almost sure to occur. In view of this fact, I think it was the duty of the 
executors to dispose of these stocks immediately upon their qualifications as 
executors. The loss to the estate resulting from their failure to act should be 
taken into consideration now in awarding them compensation for their 
services.
Id. at 43. The trustees escaped a surcharge only because the will authorized the 
executors to retain the stocks. For further discussion of this case, see Philip J. Ruse, 
The Trustee and the Prudent Investor: The Emerging Acceptance of Alternative 
Investments as the New Fiduciary Standard, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 653, 663 (2012).
27. Dobris, supra note 1, at 54–55.
28. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 18.
29. JOSH LERNER, YALE UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS OFFICE: AUGUST 2006 2
(2011).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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dollar in equity.32 This may have served Yale well in the 1930s and 1940s 
but was unsuited in the post-World War II bull markets of the 1950s and 
1960s. Yale then substantially increased its exposure to equity investments, 
as did other colleges and universities.33
A catalyst for this change was a task force report sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation that concluded that most college and university endowments 
were too conservative in their investment policies.34 The changes in 
endowment asset allocation did not result from a serendipitous recognition 
by endowment managers who had read the work of financial economists 
and had concluded equities over time were a sounder investment than 
bonds. There were external pressures on colleges and universities and other 
nonprofits.
A. Total Return Investing
Commencing in the late 1960s and 1970s, nonprofits faced inflation, 
government cutbacks in support, limitations on tuition increases at 
educational organizations, and in some sectors of education, a decline in 
demand. These developments abetted new endowment investment 
strategies,35 one of which was more liberal spending policies through what 
was termed “total return policies,” which permitted the expenditure of 
capital gains as well as traditional investment income.36 Total return 
investing allowed charities with endowments to spend more for current 
needs, and they became increasingly dependent on endowment returns for 
the annual budget.
Total return investing encouraged endowment trustees to downplay 
conservative investment strategies in favor of maximizing endowment 
growth. Institutions whose endowments had been wholly invested in bonds 
32. Id. At this time, the treasurer and trustees managed the endowment 
themselves, selecting individual bonds and high yield stocks for the portfolio. Id.
33. Id.
34. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT, MANAGING 
EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS: REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1969). The legal 
impetus for the change in philosophy of investing and spending policies was another 
Ford Foundation sponsored report. WILLIAM E. CARY & CRAIG BRIGHT, THE LAW AND 
LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS (1969).
35. Henry Hansmann, supra note 3, at 3, 10. Though gifts remained a significant 
aspect to endowment growth, particularly for smaller endowments, new approaches to 
investing provided the engine for growth. See FRED ROGERS, SOURCES OF ENDOWMENT 
GROWTH AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 4 (2005), available at
https://www.commonfund.org/InvestorResources/Publications/ 
White%20Papers/Sources%20of%20Endowment%20Growth.pdf.
36. LONGSTRETH, supra note 22, at 24–25. A portfolio managed under a total-
return policy perspective will consider the realized and unrealized gain/loss as part of 
the portfolio’s performance, in addition to the yield. The total-return endowment 
investor can achieve greater returns than that of a buy-and-hold endowment.
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or preferred stock, offering a reliable income stream, diversified their 
portfolios by allocating more to domestic and international equities and a 
wide range of alternative investments.37 Concurrently, there arose an 
increasing use of external professional investment managers who had been 
converted to the principles of Modern Portfolio Theory (“MPT”), which 
provided the intellectual foundation for a new aggressive approach to
endowment management.38
B. Modern Portfolio Theory
Beyond framing the prudent person rule, Justice Putnam in Harvard 
College v. Amory also offered some timeless investment advice: “Do what 
you will, the capital is at hazard.”39 Unless an endowment is wholly
invested in risk-free assets, such as United States Government Treasuries, 
that admonition remains true. All investments and investment strategies 
carry with them some risk in a sense of possible loss of real inflation 
adjusted value.40 Modern Portfolio Theory provides a framework for 
managing an endowment’s risk through the diversification of the portfolio. 
No longer is the focus of risk tied to the selection of individual securities. 
Modern investment management examines the portfolio as a whole, rather 
than any given type of asset or a decision concerning that asset.
In common parlance, risk is the chance of loss. In finance, risk refers to 
volatility of return.41 A fundamental responsibility of an endowment board 
member or investment advisor is to manage the risk of the endowment’s
portfolio in relation to the objectives of the fund. When an endowment’s
board and its outside investment managers contend with risk, careful 
37. According to the 2012 NCSE study of 831 colleges and university 
endowments in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2012, the average allocation for survey 
participants was: 15% in U.S. stocks, 11% in fixed income, 16% in international 
equities, 4% in cash or short term securities, and 53% in alternative investments. 2012 
NCSE, supra note 4, at 5. For endowments of $1 billion or more, the figures were 12% 
in domestic equities, 9% in fixed income, 16% in international equities, 3% in cash, 
and 54% in alternative investments. Id.
38. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 19.
39. Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 468 (1830).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (1) (1992).
41. Financial economists use risk to describe variation when the probabilities of 
possible outcomes are known. Professor Lynn Stout differentiates risk from uncertainty 
with the following example: a coin toss is risky but not uncertain. The probability of a 
coin coming up heads or tails is 50%. Returns on securities, however, are both risky 
and uncertain. No one knows with certainty whether securities prices will go up or 
down or the probability of the event. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market 
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 641 n.30 (2003). 
Volatility can be measured statistically by standard deviations, which indicate the 
degree to which an investment has varied in the course of arriving at its mean return 
over a given period. Investments with the greatest volatility have the highest standard 
deviation and should offer the greatest return.
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attention must be given to the organization’s tolerance for volatility. 
Several types of risk need be considered, including nonmarket diversifiable 
risk and market risk.42
Nonmarket diversifiable risk, also known as firm or specific risk, relates 
to the risk of a particular firm or industry. One of the central findings of 
MPT is there are large and essentially costless gains to diversifying a 
portfolio.43 Firm or industry risk can be minimized or reduced though 
holding a diversified portfolio of securities.44 For example, if new car sales 
drop in a recession and companies that operate auto repair franchises thrive 
at such times and have equivalent risk and return characteristics, a portfolio 
with both types of companies will be less risky than if the endowment 
contains only equities of one type.
A diversified portfolio may contain securities across many asset classes 
or hold many different issuers within a particular asset class or industry. No 
one compensates an investor who fails to diversify so as to minimize risk. 
In other words, an investor cannot demand a higher return from holding a 
risky security if he or she could have diversified. The proverb that 
admonishes “don’t put all of your eggs in one basket,” neatly sums up 
diversifiable risk.45 Diversification moderates risks that are inherent in 
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (1) (1992).
43. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust 
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 647 (1996).
44. Professor Stout offers this example: when fuel prices rise, airline stocks fall 
while the price of oil stocks rise. Stout, supra note 41, at 641, n.30. Investors can 
eliminate industry-specific risk by having a diversified portfolio of securities covering 
several industries. Id. The benefit of diversification of investments is far from a new 
idea. In The Merchant of Venice, Antonio speaks of it:
I thank my fortune for it,
My ventures are not in one bottom trusted
Nor to one place;
Nor is my whole estate
Upon the fortune of this present year;
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 1.
45. The phrase is very old, and its origin is unknown. In 1666, Giovanni Torriano, 
in the Second Alphabet of Proverbial Phrases, stated: “To put all ones eggs in a panier, 
viz. to hazard all in one bottom [ship].” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 91 (2d ed. 
1991). Professor John Langbein offers a more contemporary example:
[T]he investor who buys bonds issued by weaker issuers (so called junk 
bonds) assumes greater risk of default than the investor who only buys 
Treasuries. The junk bonds pay higher interest rates, compensating the 
investor for bearing the greater risk. But no one pays the investor for 
concentrating a portfolio in too small a range of asset classes or issuers. Thus, 
under diversification causes the portfolio to bear uncompensated risk, risk that 
could be largely eliminated by spreading the investments across a wider range 
of asset classes and issues.
John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to 
Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2010). A recent example of the costs that 
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investing and reduces risks that are not justified by the prospect of gain. A 
fiduciary has the responsibility of reducing or minimizing risk that can be 
avoided.46
Another type of risk affects all securities, that is, the securities markets 
as a whole. A recession, a downgrade of sovereign debt, a world war, or an 
event such as 9/11 are examples of market risk, also called systemic or 
systematic risk. Market risk is non-diversifiable since it is common to all 
securities.47 With non-diversifiable risk, the investor must be compensated 
for assuming greater risk by obtaining a higher expected return. Thus, there 
is a positive correlation between risk and expected return.48 MPT was an 
incentive to increase portfolio risk because of the lure of greater returns 
that would result.
MPT assumes that investors have two desires: they seek higher returns 
and want those expected returns to be stable and certain. Because investors 
prefer certainty, higher risk investments must offer higher expected returns 
than lower risk investments. An investor need not avoid high risk 
investments because she can reduce risk by investing in securities of 
similar risks, which are not correlated to each other—e.g. automobile 
failure to diversify may lead to involves the Cowboys Athletic Endowment of 
Oklahoma State University (“OSU”), which received a $165 million donation from oil 
man Boone Pickens to transform OSU’s athletics. The endowment invested all of its 
assets in Pickens’ hedge fund, BP Capital, as well as in an insurance program where it 
purchased life insurance policies on older OSU alumni. The hedge fund lost most of its 
value, and OSU alumni declined to die in timely fashion. The endowment, which once 
had assets of $400 million, declined to $125 million. See Ann Zimmerman, Boone 
Calls the Plays as Largess Complicates Life at Alma Mater, WALL ST. J. July 7, 2012, 
at A1. This is not only an American problem. Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan lost 
$230 million from an investment in a derivative product called a “power-reverse dual 
currency bond” that was marketed to nonprofit investors. See Hideyuki Sano, Japan’s
Temples, Universities, Hospital’s Haunted by Yen Bets, REUTERS (Jul. 23, 2013), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-japan-derivatives-idUKBRE96L0WI20130
722.
46. UPMIFA, supra note 1 § 4(e)(4); NAT’L CONF. ON COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 (1994) [hereinafter UPIA].
47. Langbein, supra note 43, at 648.
48. Expected return is a measure of return that uses the concept of probability to 
take into account the volatility or uncertainty of outcomes. It is the arithmetic mean of 
all possible outcomes. An example is you flip a coin, there is a 50% chance of heads 
and a 50% chance of tails. If you wager one dollar on the flip, you will gain two dollars 
if you win and nothing if you lose, and the expected return is one dollar. This is 
determined by multiplying the probability of each possible outcome: .5 X $2 + .5 X 0 = 
$1.00. WILLIAM KLEIN, JOHN C. COFFEE & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
AND FINANCE 242 (11th ed. 2011). This approach, the mean variance portfolio selection 
model, was developed by Harry Markowitz and posits that returns can be estimated by 
the historical mean of an asset’s returns, and risk could be quantified by the historical 
volatility of the returns, the variance. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77
(1952).
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manufacturers and auto repair chains of equivalent risk.49 The higher the 
market or systemic risk an investor accepts, the higher the rate of return 
should accompany the increased risk. If two assets give the same expected 
return, the rational investor should always select the asset with the lower 
risk. Correspondingly, if two assets returns have equivalent risks, the 
rational investor should always select the asset with the higher expected 
return.
By diversifying risk throughout a portfolio, investors can achieve greater 
portfolio returns without taking greater overall portfolio risks.50 A portfolio 
that offers the highest returns with the least variance is termed efficient.51
Individuals and institutions have differing appetites for risk. Each efficient 
portfolio has the highest level of return for an acceptable level of risk. 
Rational investors select the portfolio that best serves their taste for 
aggressive objectives or a defensive (conservative) strategy.52 They can 
combine high risk investments with risk-free ones to lower a portfolio’s
overall risk. The development of the Black-Scholes Options pricing model 
in 1973 further enabled investment managers to quantify risk through 
valuing the price of options based on five variables.53 This permitted 
investment managers to purchase or sell options to hedge portfolio risk.54
49. Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern 
Prudent Investor Doctrine, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 858 (2010).
50. A measure of a security’s volatility of return relative to the market as a whole 
is called the beta. The market as a whole has a beta of one. A beta can be derived for 
individual securities. The individual beta compares its volatility to that of the market 
beta. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) provides a formula for measuring 
expected returns on any given investment at a particular measure of risk related to the 
return. CAPM states that the expected risk premium on each investment is proportional 
to its beta. In a competitive market, the expected risk premium varies in direct 
proportion to the market beta. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN 
ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 189 (10th ed. 2011). CAPM allows 
investors to assess whether they have achieved an appropriate level of return for the 
risk they’ve assumed. STEVE LYDENBERG, MARKETS AT RISK: THE LIMITS OF MODERN 
PORTFOLIO THEORY 42 (2009), available at www.domini.com/common/pdf/Markets-
at-Risk.pdf.
51. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 192–93.
52. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
257 (1996). Optimal portfolios are achieved by examining the historical mean volatility 
of an asset and its correlation to other asset. If the stock market declines, an optimally 
diversified portfolio will consist of asset classes that will rise in such situations.
53. The variables are the current market price of the underlying stock, the 
exercise price of the option, the continuously compounded risk free rate of return 
expressed on an annual basis, the time remaining before expiration of the option, and 
the volatility of the underlying stock. WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE
192–3 (7th ed. 2012). The Black-Scholes Pricing Model enabled any derivative 
security to be priced. Id.
54. Douglas O. Edwards, An Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk 
Management Incentives After the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
247, 264–65 (2010).
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The second prong of MPT is the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
(“EMH”). In 1953, an English statistician, Maurice Kendall, presented a 
paper to the Royal Statistical Society on the behavior of stock and 
commodity prices.55 Kendall had expected to find regular price cycles, but 
to his surprise, they did not exist.56 Each price change of a security seemed 
to wander, as if a coin was tossed.57 In other words, price changes followed 
a random walk.
This means that today’s price change of a stock gives investors almost 
no clue as to the change of a stock’s price tomorrow. This does not suggest 
that the determinants of price changes are random, but they are determined 
by flows of relevant new information that arise, unrelated to past price 
movements.58 If past price changes could predict future price changes, 
investors could make easy profits, but in a competitive market such profits 
don’t last. When investors try to take advantage of the information in past 
prices of a security, its price adjusts immediately. As a result, all the 
information in past prices is reflected in today’s stock price, not 
tomorrow’s.59
EMH assumes that that in an efficient stock market, the prices of 
securities reflect all available information. Therefore, securities are 
appropriately or efficiently priced.60 This means prices of securities reflect 
55. Maurice G. Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time-Series-Part I. Prices,
117 J. OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC’Y 11 (1953).
56. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 314.
57. Id. at 314–16. Remember, the odds of heads or tails on any coin flip is always 
50%. Stout, supra note 41, at 646.
58. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 413–14 (1970). Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital 
Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991). Professor Fama was awarded the 2013 Nobel Prize 
for Economic Science. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
59. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 317. In the real world there are 
thousands of investment analysts and millions of investors. Why would so much money 
be spent on trying to discover information which will yield profits when EMH posits 
one cannot consistently beat the market? The EMH was modified in two ways: the 
market price reflects the informational level of the best informed trader, and market 
efficiency is a matter of degree. Prices reflect the value of the firm, only if all traders 
have full information. BRATTON, supra note 53, at 24. When prices get out of line, 
arbitrageurs and rational investors will swoop in and make costless profits which will 
bring securities prices back into line. Sanford J. Grossman & George E. Stiglitz, On the 
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
60. Lydenberg, supra note 50, at 43. There are several claims about the efficiency 
of prices. The more modest is that prices react quickly to new information but do not 
necessarily relate to the intrinsic value of the firm. Prices under this view are 
informationally or speculatively efficient, which means that investors cannot acquire 
information to make advantageous purchases or sales before the information is 
reflected in the security’s price. A stronger claim asserts that market prices react and 
reflect the intrinsic value of the firm. This second type of efficiency is termed “intrinsic 
value” or “allocative efficiency.” BRATTON, supra note 53, at 23.
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accurately the expected risk and return of those securities because 
securities prices incorporate the best available information about those 
securities.61
The heart of the EMH was that the market was rational and pervasive 
market forces invariably pushed securities’ prices toward their correct, 
fundamental values.62 Two conclusions follow: 1) if the EMH is correct, an 
individual investor or firm cannot develop an investing or trading strategy 
that consistently beats the market because the market price already reflects 
the information on which the investor acts; and 2) no investment is a per se
bad investment because the investment’s price already factors in the 
investment’s risk.63 Although endowments commenced investing in 
common stocks and reaped the benefits of bull markets, it was not until the 
development of MPT in the mid-1970s that, from a theoretical perspective, 
equities were considered a more stable investment than bonds.
III. THE NEW ENDOWMENT MODEL OF INVESTING
The core principles of MPT—that the correlation between risk and 
return can bring greater returns and additional risk can be managed through 
diversification of investments—made endowment managers more risk 
tolerant. Initially, portfolios shifted into equities in efficient domestic 
markets. Then, they moved into other asset classes and markets, some 
publicly traded, and others that were not.64 Diversification became global. 
Endowments increased their use of derivatives, financial instruments that 
can hedge risk or be mere speculative wagers.65
61. There is disagreement over whether prices in an efficient market are 
“informationally efficient” or “allocatively efficient.” An informationally efficient 
market responds quickly to new publicly available information. Robert M. Daines & 
Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate 
Law, 102 YALE L.J. 577, 615 (1992). An allocatively efficient market reflects the best 
estimate of the present value of a firm’s future earnings, that is, its intrinsic value. Id.
62. JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET 192 (2009).
63. Sterk, supra note 49, at 860–61. The second conclusion means that the risk 
intrinsic to any marketable security is presumptively already discounted into the current 
price of the security.  Langbein, supra note 43, at 649.
64. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 19. There are distinctions between traditional 
asset classes—cash or cash equivalents, fixed income (bonds), publicly traded equities 
(stocks)—and nontraditional or ‘alternative’ asset classes, such as private equity and 
venture capital, hedge funds, and ‘real assets’ from commodities to real estate to 
timber. Id. at 19. Within asset classes, diversification means broad exposure to 
representative markets. Id.
65. Derivatives are agreements between parties that one will pay the other a sum 
of money that is determined by whether or not a particular event will occur in the future 
to some underlying financial asset, such as an asset price, interest rate, currency 
exchange, or almost anything else. The value of the derivative is based on the value of 
the underlying asset. Lynn A. Stout, The Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis (UCLA 
Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper, 2011), available at 
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Beginning in the 1990s, larger endowments, primarily those with over 
$1 billion in assets, undertook a new approach to portfolio management 
called the “endowment model of investing.” This phrase describes a theory 
and practice of investing characterized by a highly-diversified, long-term 
portfolio that differs from a traditional stock/bond mix in that it includes 
allocations to less-traditional and less-liquid asset categories, such as 
private equity and real estate, as well as absolute return strategies.66 These 
are called alternative investments. Basically, an alternative investment is 
one that is not cash, stocks, or bonds—the three traditional asset classes. 
“Alternate investments” is a loose phrase comprising hard assets such as 
minerals and timber to financial derivatives, real estate, venture capital, and 
private equity. They are attractive to endowments because they usually 
have a low correlation to traditional asset classes, which may boost overall 
returns. They are less regulated, transparent, and liquid than traditional 
asset classes, and they often have substantial minimum capital 
requirements and charge high fees.
The endowment model of investing tries to find two or more related 
assets mispriced relative to each other. Then by buying the cheap asset, 
selling the expensive asset, and eliminating as much ancillary risk as 
possible, the objective is to produce excess returns with little or no 
correlation to the underlying market actions. The endowment might have 
substantial long and short positions to capture the full potential of a small 
mispricing.67
Yale, Harvard, and other wealthy endowments became proponents of 
this widespread shift into alternative, arcane, and illiquid investments, 
which were in emerging, inefficient, and nontraditional markets.68 The 
justification for this approach is explained by one of the endowment 
model’s most successful practitioners, David F. Swenson, Chief Investment 
Officer of the Yale Endowment: “Alternative assets, by their very nature
tend to be less efficiently priced than traditional marketable securities, 
http:ssrn.com/abstract=1770082.
66. JANE L. MENDILLO, HARVARD MANAGEMENT COMPANY ENDOWMENT 
REPORT, MESSAGE FROM THE CEO 3 (Sept. 2010), available at
http://cdn.wds.harvard.edu/2010_endowment_report _09_09_2010.pdf. Absolute return 
strategies include short selling, futures, derivatives, arbitrage, leverage (borrowing or 
lending funds), and unconventional assets, similar to hedge funds. An absolute return 
strategy attempts to provide positive returns independent from markets’ movements. 
YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 10. Absolute strategies differ from 
relative strategies in that the latter seek to top a benchmark, for example, the Dow 
Jones Industrials.
67. ANDRÉ PEROLD & ERIK STAFFORD, HARVARD MANAGEMENT COMPANY 3
(2010).
68. In 1990 Yale had 75% of its endowment in domestic marketable securities. 
YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 3. It shrank to 5.8% in 2012. Id. 
The average endowment model investment in domestic equities is 15%. 2012 NCSE, 
supra note 4, at 5.
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providing an opportunity to exploit market inefficiencies through active 
management.”69 However, these same alternative investments may offer 
little transparency or liquidity, carry higher risks than traditional asset 
classes, and may involve speculative trading strategies.70 For many years, 
the highest returns were earned by the largest endowments, which had 
access to the most sophisticated money managers and the in-house 
expertise to evaluate a complex mix of alternative investments.
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE NEW PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE
The promise of flexibility conveyed by the prudent person standard 
failed in application because interpretations rendered by judges and 
commentators were more receptive to the legal principle of stare decisis
than to the evolving economic principles that inform investment 
management.71 Trustees worried about their legal liabilities. Cary and 
Bright’s 1969 study concluded that there was little developed law 
restricting the power of trustees to invest endowment funds to achieve 
growth, and the impediments to such freedom of action were more 
legendary than real.72 However, the lack of constraining legal precedent 
was insufficient for institutional trustees to ignore prudence and the 
conservatism inherent in trust law principles.73 Modern portfolio 
69. YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 9. Alternative investments 
include hedge funds, which traditionally were pools of capital used to purchase 
securities on both sides of a market risk. Today, the term connotes any lightly regulated 
investment pool that engages in a wide range of investment strategies, some of which 
are high-risk, which seek to generate superior long-term returns by exploiting market 
inefficiencies. Alternative investments also include private equity, such as venture 
capital and leveraged buyout funds, which take stakes in start-up businesses or buy 
firms primarily with borrowed money in the hope of cashing out at a later time when 
the firm is acquired by another company or goes public. The largest endowments also 
achieve diversification by investing in real assets, such as real estate, oil and gas, and 
timber.
70. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 20. Investors demand a premium for placing 
assets in an illiquid investment. The illiquidity premium refers to the fact that the 
investment cannot quickly be converted to cash. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 729. 
In times of financial need or extreme stress in the markets, an illiquid investment 
cannot be turned into cash except at a great loss or not at all. The advantage of illiquid 
investments is that the holder does not have to pay a liquidity premium as part of the 
price, thereby increasing the return on the investment. Those who may need cash in the 
short term cannot commit to such long term investments. From a long term perspective, 
this works well, but if any of the illiquid funds are needed in the present as they were in 
2008 and cannot be obtained, the university will have to borrow or cut the budget or 
both. Id. at 731–32.
71. See Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 466–68 (1830).
72. CARY & BRIGHT, supra note 34, at 60.
73. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr. Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 
77 IOWA L. REV. 1151, 1153–54 (1992); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence 
of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987); JAMES J. FISHMAN 
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management demanded a new paradigm of prudence, which embraced 
modern economic theory and received unquestioned legal approval.74
Commencing in the late 1960s, several legislative and regulatory 
initiatives departed from the traditional prudence standard in defining the 
duties of fiduciaries of pension funds, endowments, and charities; 
recognized the need for diversification; permitted delegation of 
responsibility; and adopted modern portfolio theory.75 In 1969, Congress 
enacted a restrictive enforcement regime over private foundations, which 
included a prohibition on jeopardy investments.76 The Treasury regulations 
interpreting that section of the Internal Revenue Code accepted the 
principles of MPT and stated that in the exercise of the requisite standard of 
care and prudence, “foundation managers may take into account . . . the 
need for diversification within the investment portfolio.”77 The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and its regulations 
applicable to pension funds utilized the corporate standard of care and 
prudence.78 It also adopted MPT by mandating that a fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties by “diversifying the investments of the plan so as to 
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is 
clearly prudent not to do so.”79
Of particular importance to endowment managers was the adoption, 
eventually in forty-eight states, of the Uniform Management of Institutional 
Funds Act of 1972 (“UMIFA”), applicable to charitable organizations.80
UMIFA clarified legal concerns by authorizing governing boards to invest 
an endowment fund with the standards of care and prudence applicable to 
corporate trustees.81 It gave specific investment authority for governing 
boards to invest in a wide range of personal and real property,82 and it 
clarified the right of nonprofits to delegate and to contract with independent 
financial advisors.83 The section dealing with the standard of care was 
derived from the Treasury’s private foundation regulations dealing with 
& STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 208 (4th 
ed. 2010).
74. LONGSTRETH, supra note 22, at 152–57.
75. Id. at 4.
76. I.R.C. § 4944 (2012). See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 73, at 794–95, 
for a simplified description of this complicated area of the law.
77. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i) (1973).
78. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 
U.S.C.§ 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012); see also LONGSTRETH, supra note 22, at 32–36.
79. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(C).
80. NAT’L CONF. ON COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. MGMT. OF 
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2 (1972), available at 
http://www.nacua.org/documents/umifa.pdf [hereinafter UMIFA].
81. Id. at § 2.
82. Id. at § 4.
83. Id. at § 5.
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investment responsibility of managers of private foundations.84 UMIFA 
required governing boards to exercise “ordinary business care and 
prudence” under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the 
action or decision.85 Boards could consider the long and short term needs of 
the institution in carrying out its exempt purposes, its present and 
anticipated financial requirements, expected total return on its investments, 
price level trends, and general economic conditions.86 The UMIFA 
comment to the section stated that the standard of care is comparable to the 
business corporate director rather than that of a private trustee.87
In the late 1980s and early 1990s came the drafting of uniform laws 
relating to trusts and the third revision of the influential Restatement of 
Trusts.88 All adopted MPT and a new definition of prudent investment 
management. The first part of the restatement project appeared in 1992 
with the publication of a volume on the prudent person rule.89 Section 227 
presented the standard of prudent investment, and the general comment to 
that section offered a detailed discussion of MPT as the foundation of 
prudent investing.90
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws approved the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”), which has 
been adopted in forty-four states.91 UPIA regulates the investment 
responsibilities of trustees of private and charitable trusts and explicitly 
adopted the MPT,92 as did the Uniform Trust Code approved in 1994, 
which has been adopted in whole or part by twenty-five states.93
A revision of the UMIFA commenced in 2006. It bootstrapped upon the 
principles of the UPIA and was renamed the Uniform Prudent Management 
84. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i) (1973).
85. UMIFA, supra note 80, at § 6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at § 5.
88. UPIA, supra note 46.
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT PERSON RULE § 227 (1992).
90. See id. at cmt.e (1)-p, renumbered as § 90 in 2007. Renumbered sections are 
used hereinafter.
91. UPIA, supra note 46.
92. Id. at § 2b. The UPIA offers a template for the process of prudent investing: 
(1) the standard of prudence is applied to any investment as part of a total portfolio 
rather than to individual investments (2) the trade-off in all investing between risk and 
return is a fiduciary’s central consideration; (3) there are no categorical restrictions on 
types of investments; the trustee can invest in anything that plays an appropriate role in 
achieving the risk/return objectives of prudent investing; (4) diversification of 
investments is part of the definition of prudent investing; and (5) delegation of 
investment and management functions is specifically permitted. Id. at § 2(9). See
generally Langbein, supra note 43.
93. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 cmt. (2010). The comment to this section states in 
part: “This section is similar to Section 2(a) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).” Id.
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of Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”).94 The revision has been adopted 
by forty-nine states,95 and it provides a modern articulation of the prudence 
standards for the management and investment of charitable funds and for 
endowment spending.96 UPMIFA section 3 specifically incorporates the 
principles of MPT and the prudence standard found in the UPIA.97 It 
authorizes governing boards to invest in a wide range of personal and real 
property,98 and it sets forth many of the factors a charity should take into 
account in making a prudent investment decision.99 Section 3 also 
incorporates the general duty to diversify investments and consider the risk 
and return objectives of the fund.100
94. UPMIFA, supra note 1. UPMIFA applies to charitable “institutions,” a 
category that includes incorporated or unincorporated organizations operated 
exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or other eleemosynary purposes, or 
government entities to the extent they hold funds exclusively for those purposes. Id. at
§ 2(4). It also applies to trusts managed by a charity. Id. The revisers’ goal was that 
standards for managing and investing institutional funds should be the same regardless 
of whether a charity is organized as a trust, corporation, or some other entity. Id. at 
Prefactory Note. However, the rules do not apply to funds of wholly charitable or split-
interest trusts (such as charitable remainder trusts) managed by a corporate or 
individual trustee. Id. In most states, those types of charitable trusts are subject to 
comparable rules under modern prudent investor statutes. Id.
95. The lone holdout is Pennsylvania.
96. The commentary to Section 3 states in part:
Purpose and Scope of Revisions. This section adopts the prudence standard 
for investment decision making. The section directs directors or others 
responsible for managing and investing the funds of an institution to act as a 
prudent investor would, using a portfolio approach in making investments and 
considering the risk and return objectives of the fund. The section lists the 
factors that commonly bear on decisions in fiduciary investing and 
incorporates the duty to diversify investments absent a conclusion that special 
circumstances make a decision not to diversify reasonable.
UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3 cmt. Thus, this section follows modern portfolio theory 
for investment decision-making.
97. Id. at § 3.
98. Id. at § 3(e).
99. Id.
100. Id. Except as otherwise provided by a gift instrument, the following rules 
apply:
(1) In managing and investing an institutional fund, the following factors, if 
relevant, must be considered:
(A) general economic conditions;
(B) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(C) the expected tax consequences, if any, of investment decisions or
strategies;
(D) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the 
overall investment portfolio of the fund;
(E) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of 
investments;
(F) other resources of the institution;
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UPMIFA’s standard of care is derived from the Internal Revenue Code’s
private foundation regulations dealing with investment responsibility of 
managers of private foundations.101 Boards must exercise “the care an 
ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise” under the facts 
and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision.102 They 
may consider the long and short term needs of the institution in carrying 
out its exempt purposes, its present and anticipated financial requirements, 
expected total return on its investments, price level trends, and general 
economic conditions. The commentary to the section states that the 
standard of care is comparable to the business corporate director rather than 
a private trustee. Section 5 adopts the delegation standards of UPIA section 
nine,103 and it clarifies the right of nonprofit fiduciaries to delegate and to 
contract with independent financial advisors.104
UPMIFA’s statement of its prudence standard attempts to straddle 
between the cautionary language of trust law and the more lenient attitude 
toward the duty of care under corporate principles, as evinced in the Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act (Third).105 The UPMIFA comment says that 
even though the nonprofit standard is nominally similar to the corporate 
standard—the words are the same—there is recognition that the entity is a 
(G) the needs of the institution and the fund to make distributions and to 
preserve capital; and
(H) an asset’s special relationship or special value, if any, to the 
charitable purposes of the institution.
(2) Management and investment decisions about an individual asset must be 
made not in isolation but rather in the context of the institutional fund’s
portfolio of investments as a whole and as a part of an overall investment 
strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the fund and to 
the institution.
(3) Except as otherwise provided by law other than this [act], an institution 
may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent with this 
section.
(4) An institution shall diversify the investments of an institutional fund 
unless the institution reasonably determines that, because of special 
circumstances, the purposes of the fund are better served without 
diversification.
(5) Within a reasonable time after receiving property, an institution shall 
make and carry out decisions concerning the retention or disposition of the 
property or to rebalance a portfolio, in order to bring the institutional fund 
into compliance with the purposes, terms, and distribution requirements of the 
institution as necessary to meet other circumstances of the institution and the 
requirements of this [act]. 
Id.
101. See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (1973).
102. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3(b).
103. Id. at §5 cmt.
104. Id.
105. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1987).
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charity and not a business corporation.106 Significantly, the language of 
section 3 dealing with the standard of conduct avoids the word “caution,”
which is found in the trust law equivalent.107
The comment adds that trust law norms already inform managers of 
nonprofit corporations in their decision-making, but then states that trust 
precedents have routinely been found to be helpful but not binding 
authority.108 It may be that this language was the result of a political 
compromise among the drafters and interest groups. It does not offer 
sufficient guidance as to the standard that should be used. In light of the 
financial crisis’ impact on endowments in 2008, if there is one guideline 
that is needed to remind fiduciaries of their responsibilities, it is caution.
V. CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
By the time the legal framework caught up with and endorsed the MPT,
fissures had appeared in its theoretical framework. In the 1980s, empirical 
studies and unexpected events demonstrated anomalies that suggested the 
markets were not as efficient as the theory postulated.109
MPT assumed that risk and return could be accurately calculated, as 
could the covariances between them. An efficient securities market would 
reflect their fundamental value.110 However, securities’ market prices may 
not be good indicators of rationally evaluated economic value. Think of the 
many corporate executives and investment analysts who believe certain 
106. The standard is consistent with the business judgment standard under 
corporate law, as applied to charitable institutions. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3.
107. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 (2010); UPIA, supra note 46 § 2(a);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (1992).
108. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3 cmt.
109. One example is that closed-end funds trade at a discount to their fundamental 
value. A closed-end fund is an investment vehicle with a limited number of shares. It is 
closed-end because only a limited number of shares are issued and typically shares are 
not redeemable until the fund liquidates. Closed-end fund shares are issued in a public 
offering and thereafter purchased on a secondary market. In an open-end fund, the fund 
management creates new shares in exchange for consideration or redeems outstanding 
shares. The price of a share in a closed-end fund that contains publicly traded securities 
and pays dividends equal to the dividends on the stocks in its portfolio is valued on the 
basis of those dividends. BRATTON, supra note 53 at 15, 26, 774–75. The fundamental 
value of the fund is the net asset value of the securities in it divided by the number of 
shares in the fund. However, instead of closed-end funds trading at their fundamental 
value as would be expected in an efficient market, they usually trade at discounts, 
though occasionally they trade at a premium. These discounts cannot be explained in 
terms of fundamental value factors. See Reiner Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: 
The Implications of “Discounted Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 891, 902–05 (1988).
110. Fundamental value means that an asset is valued at its future cash flows and 
the opportunity cost of capital. If the price equals the fundamental value, the expected 
rate of return is the opportunity cost of capital. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 
50, at 321.
222 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 40, No. 2
securities are underpriced or overpriced. The statement that diversification 
reduces risk without reducing expected return is mathematically true, 
assuming there exists a reliable mechanism for ascertaining the risk and 
expected return of individual investments. However, some scholarship 
questions whether market price accurately reflects risk or return.111
Harry Markowitz, who developed the relationship between maximizing 
a portfolio’s expected return for a given amount of risk, never suggested 
that the fundamental valuation of a security was easily obtainable.112 It may 
be impossible to measure whether stocks are correctly valued because no 
one can measure true value with precision.113 Thus, we do not know if 
market levels are consistent with fundamentals (i.e. the prospects for profits 
or dividends). Periodically, investors exhibit an irrational exuberance 
which may push stock prices to an unjustifiable level. Eventually, such 
bubbles burst, and investors then may become unduly negative.114
The “dot com” bubble of 1995 until 2000 led to a NASDAQ Composite 
Index rise of five-hundred and eighty percent, only to decline by October 
2002 by seventy-eight percent from its peak.115 The Japanese bubble of 
1985 until 1990 and the real estate bubble of the 2000s are other examples 
of bubbles and bursts where prices diverged from the fundamental values 
predicted by the EMH.116 However, crashes have occurred without the 
antecedent bubble. On October 19, 1987, the New York Stock Exchange 
Dow Jones Index declined by over 500 points, and by the end of the month 
111. Sterk, supra note 49, at 868. One of the theoretical criticisms of the EMH is 
that it cannot be empirically tested.
[W]e cannot test the validity of the efficient market hypothesis alone; every 
test of EMH also assumes some particular theory of what the ‘right’ price for 
an asset is. These asset pricing models establish the benchmark of ‘normal’
returns in order to determine the efficiency of the market. Consequently, 
every empirical test of the efficient market hypothesis is a ‘joint test’ of both 
the hypothesis and an asset pricing model. If the test yields evidence 
consistent with market efficiency, it also yields evidence consistent with the 
asset pricing model. If however, the test yields anomalous evidence, either the 
market is inefficient or the asset pricing model used is incorrect (or possibly 
both EMH and the pricing model are wrong).
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and 
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 772 (1985).
112. Markowitz, supra note 48, at 81 n.7 (“This paper does not consider the 
difficult question of how investors do (or should) form their probability beliefs”).
113. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 325.
114. Id. The phrase irrational exuberance was first used by the former chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central 
Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer 
Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996)
(transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/1996 
1205.htm#pagetop).
115. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 325.
116. Id. at 325–26.
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had dropped by one third, raising doubts about the theory.117 The financial 
crisis of 2008 called into question the intellectual assumptions upon which 
modern investing is based, as well as the legal and regulatory regimes 
influenced by the theory.118
A. Evidence of Market Inefficiencies
As the MPT gained adherents, puzzling evidence emerged of anomalies 
in the EMH where actual prices differed from fundamental values. These 
anomalies concerned both short term effects and long lasting inefficiencies. 
Some could be explained, but others seemed inexplicable, even bizarre.119
Empirical studies challenged the EMH assumptions,120 leading to an 
117. BRATTON, supra note 53, at 39–40.
118. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 39–47 (2009) [hereinafter TURNER 
REVIEW], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. Lord Adair 
Turner, who was the chairman of the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority at the time, 
prepared the report.
119. Empirical research discovered: 1) The January Effect: returns are higher in 
January than in other months and lower on Monday than on other days of the week. 
Most of the daily return comes at the beginning and end of the day. Because of 
transaction costs involving infrequent trading, this finding and others do not necessarily 
lead to successful trading activity; 2) The Small Firm Effect: longer term inefficiencies 
included stocks with the lowest market capitalizations that performed substantially 
better than those with the highest capitalizations; 3) The Earnings Announcement 
Puzzle: stock performance following the announcement of unexpectedly good or bad
earnings indicated the 10% of securities with the best earnings news outperformed 
those with the worst news by about 1% per month over a six month period following 
the announcement. Investors apparently underreact to earnings announcements and 
become aware of the full significance only as further information arrives; 4) The New 
Issue Puzzle: when initial public offerings (“IPOs”) come to market, investors rush to 
buy and receive an immediate capital gain if they sell. However, these early gains turn 
into losses, if the investor purchased the stock immediately following each IPO and 
held onto the issue for five years. From 1970 until 2007, the average annual return 
would have been 3.8% less than the return on a portfolio of similarly sized stocks. Id. at 
322. These and other conclusions have been criticized or rationalized by other scholars. 
Id. at 323; 5) The Sunshine Effect: A study of stock returns in twenty-six countries 
found a significant positive correlation between morning sunshine and stock returns.
David Hirschliefer & Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and 
Weather, 58 J. FIN. 1009 (2003). Rain and snow are unrelated to stock returns. Another 
“mood and markets” study found that in a cross-section of thirty-nine countries using 
international soccer results as a primary mood variable, losses in soccer matches have 
an economically and statistically significant negative effect on the losing countries’
stock market. For example, a loss in the World Cup elimination stage leads to a next 
day abnormal stock return of minus forty-nine basis points. See Alex Edmans, Diego 
Rivera & Øyvind Norly, Sports Sentiment & Stock Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1967 (2007).
120. Some of the other diversions from how the EMH is expected to perform 
include: 1) volatility: stock prices overreact to changes in fundamentals; stock price 
volatility over the past century appears to be too high to be attributable to new 
information about dividends; return volatility is greater when the market is open than 
when it is closed; suggesting the market makes its own news, which is not keyed to 
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ongoing debate over the efficiency of the markets.121
B. Evidence of Investor Irrationality: The Rise of Behavioral Finance
An important assumption of the EMH was that investors were rational 
agents and utility maximizers. Irrational investors, those who bought or 
sold on the basis of a hunch or other non-rational theories, were irrelevant 
to the market. They would be taken advantage of by arbitrageurs,122 and 
their systematic losses would drive them from the market.123
Economics assumes investors, firms, and their managers act as if they 
are rational; the fields of sociology and psychology question this 
assumption.124 Behavioral finance applies the teachings of psychology to 
the behavior of investors, focusing on experiments that have discovered 
fundamentals; 2) timing: documented patterns in stock returns over weekends, holidays 
and different calendar periods affect returns—returns tend to be negative on Mondays; 
serial correlation—over short periods of time, price changes tend to persist 
contradicting the random walk model; 3) contrarian investment strategies: “value”
investing strategies produce high returns over time, which means that high market to 
book value firms are growth stocks, favored by the market earn lower returns than 
inexpensive “value” stocks; growth stock investors overreact optimistically to recent 
history of good news about those stocks; 4) sentiment: investor sentiment may explain 
serially correlated returns. For a description of these anomalies and citations to the 
literature, see BRATTON, supra note 53, at 25–28.
121. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Multi-Factor Explanations of 
Market Pricing Anomalies, 51 J. FIN. 55 (1996); Burton Malkiel, The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59 (2003).
122. Arbitrage is a strategy that exploits market efficiencies and generates superior 
returns if and when prices return to their fundamental value. The arbitrageur buys an 
underpriced security, pushing up its price, and sells an overvalued security, pushing 
down that security’s price. The arbitrageur’s profit is the difference between the 
irrational price and the fundamental one. However, there are risk and trading costs. 
BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 327–28.
123. Gilson & Kraackman, supra note 58, at 583 (discussing that “market 
discipline in the form of heavy trading losses will restrain idiosyncratic traders and may 
even eliminate them through a ‘Darwinian’ process of natural selection”); Stout, supra
note 41, at 665 (quoting Milton Friedman, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, in 
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 175 (1953)). If prices diverged from their fundamental 
value, arbitrageurs would exploit the price differential and drive the price back to its 
fundamental value. However, there may be more irrational traders than the EMH 
assumed, and arbitrage opportunities may be more risky and limited than initially 
believed. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to 
Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., 19, 20–23 (1990). For arbitrage trading, costs can be 
significant, some trades can be difficult to execute, and the market may diverge from 
fundamental prices before it converges, making it difficult for the arbitrageur to hold on 
until the market moves in the right direction. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 
50, at 327.
124. Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A 
Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2011).
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investors often acted through their personal biases in a non-rational way.125
These investors, termed noise traders, act on the basis of their beliefs, 
personal experiences, the advice of their brokers or stock gurus, or chase 
popular trends, rather than on the basis of fundamentals.126 Behavioral 
finance research suggests that irrational investors are not only a larger 
cohort than previously believed, but that they can affect market prices and 
profit over time, more than the MPT believed was possible.127
125. The idea that passion rather than reason is the dominant element in human 
action was the view of philosopher David Hume. See, DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF 
HUMAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (“Reason 
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other 
office than to serve and obey them.”). See In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 
938 (Del Ch. 2003) for a related judicial expression.
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that 
simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of 
the law and economics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo 
economicus. We may be thankful that an array of other motivations exist that 
influence human behavior; not all are any better than greed or avarice, think 
of envy, to name just one. But also think of motives like love, friendship, and 
collegiality, think of those among us who direct their behavior as best they 
can on a guiding creed or set of moral values.
Id.
126. BRATTON, supra note 53, at 29; Shleifer & Summers, supra note 123, at 19.
127. Among the conclusions about investor behavior that contradict the MPT’s
assumptions are: 1) Loss aversion—psychological experiments discovered that people 
may be more loss averse than risk averse. This means that the value investors place on 
an outcome is affected by their fear of incurring losses. Rather than viewing the current 
value of their holdings for investment decision-making, they consider whether their 
investment has shown a gain or a loss. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect 
theory, based on this insight, posits that the value investors place on a particular 
outcome is determined by the gains or losses they have incurred since the asset was 
acquired or the holding last reviewed. Investors are particularly averse to the possibility 
of even small losses and need a high return to compensate for this. BREALEY, MYERS &
ALLEN, supra note 50, at 326. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). This 
translates that investors will hold on to a stock too long, rather than selling it as a 
rational trader would do; 2) Investors that have incurred gains are more likely to take 
risks. Thus, if investors are ahead in a security, they may be more prepared to take risks 
of losses than if they already have suffered losses in that security; 3) An incorrect 
estimation of probabilities. Psychologists have found that when judging the probability 
of future outcomes, investors look at a very small sample of similar situations and 
overreact to that result and project it into the future. This is termed the 
Representativeness Heuristic. For instance, an investment manager may be considered 
particularly skilled because he or she has beaten the market in three consecutive years.  
BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 326; BRATTON, supra note 53, at 36 
(citing David Kahneman & Mark Riepe, Aspects of Investor Psychology, 24 J. 
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 52 (1998)). The investor may not acknowledge that three or five 
years is too short of a time frame to make an informed judgment. The legendary hedge 
fund manager, John Paulson, confirms this statement: In 2007 and 2008 at the height of 
the financial crisis, Paulson earned $20 billion for betting against subprime mortgage-
backed securities and global financial firms. In 2009 he extended his winning streak by 
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Behavioral finance emphasizes that the limits to arbitrage and noise 
traders’ widespread biases and hunches push prices away from their 
fundamental values. It delivers significant challenges to the MPT but is far 
from a knockout blow and remains controversial. Critics have concluded 
that the studies may be useful to arbitrageurs, but they offer theorists 
merely a prediction that securities’ prices sometimes depart from informed 
estimates of securities’ values in arbitrary and capricious ways.128
VI. WHAT WENT WRONG?
A. The Underestimation of Uncertainty
The MPT dealt effectively with conveying the need for management of 
risk but failed to adequately acknowledge the constant presence of 
uncertainty. It assumed the risk characteristics of financial markets could 
be inferred from mathematical analyses that would deliver accurate 
quantitative measures of trading risk. Correlations between risk and return 
are more difficult to value than assumed. The underlying methodological 
assumption was that accurate estimates can be based upon statistical 
analyses of past performance. There was an overreliance that past price 
movement patterns could deliver statistically robust inferences relating to 
the probability of price movements in the future.129
being bullish on the stock market, and he invested in gold before the price climbed, 
earning for himself nearly $5 billion in 2010. Since then, one of his largest hedge funds 
has lost nearly 50% of its value because of mistimed investments on banks and other 
stocks. One of his single investments lost $500 million in 2011. See Gregory 
Zuckerman, Suit Faults Paulson’s Sino-Forest Bet, WALL ST. J. Feb. 22, 2012, at C2; 
Azam Ahmed, JAT Capital, Down 20%, Is a Lesson In Volatility, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2012, at B1. Past success is no predictor of future profits; 4) Conservativeness. 
Individual investors tend to be too slow to update their beliefs in light of new evidence. 
They will eventually update their beliefs in the correct direction but the magnitude of 
the change is less than a rational response would mandate. BREALEY, ALLEN & MYERS,
supra note 44, at 326; BRATTON, supra note 53, at 36 (citing Nicholas Barberis, Andrei 
& Robert Vishny, A Model of Investor Sentiment, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 307 (1998)); 5) 
Overconfidence. Investors are systematically overconfident about their investment 
prowess, which exaggerates the precision of their private judgments about the value of 
a security and underestimates the significance of public signals or the possibility of 
unexpected events. BREALEY, ALLEN & MYERS, supra note 44, at 326; BRATTON, supra 
note 53, at 36 (citing Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subramanyam,
Investor Psychology and Security Market Under and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839 
(1998)).
128. Stout, supra note 41, at 661. The classic rejoinder to behavioral finance is by 
Merton Miller, a Nobel Laureate in economic sciences: “That we abstract from all these 
stories in building our models is not because the stories are uninteresting but because 
they may be too interesting and thereby distract us from the pervasive market forces 
that should be our principal concern.” Merton H. Miller, Behavioral Rationality in 
Finance: The Case of Dividends, 59 J. BUS. S451–S467 (1986).
129. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 118, at 1.4(iii). The models to measure risk used 
by financial firms, VaR or “value at risk,” were flawed. Douglas O. Edwards, An 
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Probabilities based on historical data assumed normal distributions in the 
shape of a bell curve as one would find in the natural sciences.130 In fact, 
several events in recent decades—the sudden market drop of 1987, the 
Long Term Capital meltdown in 1999, the “dot com” bust of 2000, and the 
financial crisis of 2008—underestimated the full distribution of price 
movements. These events lead to the conclusion that financial market 
movements are characterized more than ever imagined by what are known 
as fat-tails or black swans—events considered so rare they need not be 
considered as a measure of risk, but in fact occur more frequently than 
predicted.131
Though a Nobel Prize is given for economic sciences, economics and 
finance are very different from the certainties of the natural sciences. As 
Emanuel Derman, a physicist who later served as a head of quantitative 
analysis at Goldman Sachs, has written, “[i]n physics you’re playing 
against God, and He doesn’t change His laws very often. In finance, you’re 
playing against God’s creatures, agents who value assets based on their 
ephemeral opinions.”132 The belief in the mathematical rigor of statistics’
ability to predict risk blinded proponents of the MPT to the constant 
presence of uncertainty, about which the brightest minds have warned. In 
Kenneth Arrow’s words, “[i]t is my view that most individuals 
underestimate the uncertainty of the world. . . .To me our knowledge of the 
way things work, in society or in nature, comes trailing clouds of 
Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk Management Incentives After The Financial 
Crisis of 2007–2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 266–67 (2010). VaR measures the 
potential loss in value of an asset or portfolio at a given confidence level over a 
specified period. To the advantage of investment professionals, it communicates risk 
exposure in a single dollar amount that is supposed to show how much a firm has at 
risk on a particular day. VaR models have come under criticism for underestimating 
rare or unprecedented events and for failing to consider correlations among risks or 
coupling of risks. Kristin Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’
Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55 (2011).
130. A bell curve or normal distribution is tall and wide in the middle where most 
things measured occur and drops or flattens out at the ends or bottoms, making the 
whole distribution resemble a bell.
131. In finance, a fat tail refers to price movements far more variable than models 
of risk predicted. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 118, at 1.4(iii). A Black Swan is an 
event with the following three attributes. First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the 
realm of regular expectations because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its 
possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, 
human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it 
explainable and predictable. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT 
OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE xvii–xix, 141–42 (2007). The Turner Review criticizes the 
idea that past distribution patterns carry robust influence for the probability of future 
patterns of distinguishing between the world of physics, the world of the natural 
sciences, and the world of social sciences (such as economics). TURNER REVIEW, supra 
note 118.
132. EMANUEL DERMAN, MODELS BEHAVING BADLY: WHY CONFUSING ILLUSION 
WITH REALITY CAN LEAD TO DISASTER, ON WALL STREET AND IN LIFE 140 (2011).
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vagueness. Vast ills have followed a belief in certainty.”133
The MPT remains, as it should, the fundamental approach to portfolio 
investing. Yet, its practitioners need to be more cautious about its promises 
and parsimonious about its capability to manage risk in all circumstances. 
The MPT may only apply in certain markets involving certain securities 
and investments in that market. Understanding the limits of the MPT may 
lead to more informed policies of acceptable risk.
B. The Financial Crisis
Aside from the staggering declines in endowment values, the 2008 
financial crisis presented three problems for acolytes of the endowment 
model of investing: 1) insufficient liquidity existed for endowments to 
contribute to annual budgetary obligations at the same dollar level, which 
impacted normal operations and undermined one of the rationalizations for 
massive endowments; 2) increased collateral obligations to hedge funds 
and private equity partners mandated investing additional resources, 
thereby exacerbating endowments’ liquidity problems;134 and 3) a lack of 
resources to pursue newly cheap investment opportunities.
133. Kenneth J. Arrow, I Know a Hawk from a Handsaw, in EMINENT 
ECONOMISTS: THEIR LIFE PHILOSOPHIES 46 (Michael Szenberg ed. 1992). Professor 
Arrow received the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. The ongoing presence of 
uncertainty with regularity was expressed in 1703 by the great mathematician Gottfried 
Liebnitz: “Nature has established patterns originating in the return of events, but only 
for the most part.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 52, at 329.
This has been echoed by John Maynard Keynes, who wrote:
If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of knowledge for 
estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile 
factory, the good will of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the 
City of London amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years 
hence . . . Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the 
instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of 
our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a 
mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most 
probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of 
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a 
result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, 
and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits 
multiplied by quantitative probabilities . . . We are merely reminding 
ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or 
political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since 
the basis for making such calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate 
urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves 
choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we 
can, but often falling back for our motive or whim or sentiment or chance.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, &
MONEY 149–50, 161–66 (1936).
134. Many of the illiquid investments contained options by the counterparty to call 
for additional funds from college and university investors.
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Alternative investments’ illiquidity and volatility increased losses in 
2008, affecting results of the fiscal year 2009. The alternative investments 
were difficult to unload. Prices offered in secondary markets were so low 
that major college and university endowments pulled back from selling.135
Proponents of the endowment model of investing correctly point out that 
even with such losses, the long term returns were greater than if the 
endowments remained invested in equities and bonds. This justification, 
however, ignores the impact of the losses on college and university 
programs and on its constituencies and the wider community.
During this period, colleges, universities, and other charities largely 
ignored the theoretical justifications for their endowments—spending more 
to smooth out flows of revenue in lean years and ensuring intergenerational 
equity for today’s students.136 Peter Conti-Brown posits a trade-off between 
additional spending and selling assets to increase liquidity and reducing the 
annual budget contribution of the endowment. Colleges and universities 
took the latter course of cutting budgets, firing staff, and deferring new 
projects, which disrupted essential college and university functions.137
Harvard, which in recent history has competed with Yale and Stanford for 
first place in the endowment performance derby, offers a cautionary tale of 
the dangers of excessive risk and illiquidity. It invested a huge amount in 
swaps, financial instruments that lock in interest rates, with the expectation 
that rates would rise in the future when the University would borrow 
heavily to build its new Allston campus.138 After the financial markets 
unexpectedly collapsed in 2007, central banks reduced some bank lending 
135. Harvard unsuccessfully attempted to sell $1.5 billion in private-equity stakes 
on the secondary market in fall 2008. It then made a $2.5 billion bond offering to cover 
swaps agreements that were wagers that interest rates would rise, when Harvard build 
its Allston campus. When rates fell to near zero, Harvard had to pay a margin call on 
$1 billion to large banks. The University paid approximately $100 million to unwind 
swaps related to hundreds of millions of dollars in variable rate borrowings. The 
ultimate cost to the University was $1.8 billion. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 733–
35; Michael McDonald, John Lauerman & Gillian Wee, Harvard Swaps Are So Toxic 
Even Summers Won’t Explain, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2009, 4:28 PM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid =aHQ2Xh55jI.Q; Tellus 
Report, supra note 17, at 37–38. Other colleges and universities found themselves in 
similar situations, though not quite of the same scale.
136. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 2–3. A few nonprofit institutions such as 
the New York City Opera tapped into their endowments to cover enormous budget 
deficits. This provided temporary relief but ultimately did not save the organization. 
See James B. Stewart, A Ransacked Endowment at New York City Opera, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 12, 2013, at B1; Daniel J. Wakin, New York City Opera to Leave Lincoln Center, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, at A1; Daniel J. Wakin, City Opera Taps Into Endowment, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2009, at C2.
137. Conti-Brown observes that the financial crisis may have given college and 
university administrators the opportunity to cut into areas that were justified, but which
in the good years were politically impossible. Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 740.
138. McDonald, Lauerman & Wee, supra note 135.
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rates to zero. This meant the value of the swaps declined and as part of its 
swaps agreements, Harvard had to post approximately $1 billion in 
collateral.139 To a lesser extent, other schools were in the same position. 
Private equity investments often have future call commitments, which 
require investors to put up additional funds upon request. Were the 
possibilities of private equity calls and posting additional swaps collateral 
factored into the risk models? Or were the risk models inaccurate?
As the endowment sunk, Harvard’s cash account declined sharply. The 
University did what individuals do when they need cash—they borrowed—
$2.5 billion, of which nearly $500 million was used to terminate the swaps 
agreements.140 Harvard’s problems were exacerbated by the percentage of 
the endowment allocated to illiquid assets. Even the cash account, normally 
invested conservatively in short-term commercial paper and money market 
funds, had been eighty percent invested along with the endowment, which 
was an extremely risky move. The impact on the university was substantial. 
Capital spending was cut in half, and the building of the new campus 
postponed. There were layoffs, closure of libraries, pay freezes, and budget 
cuts.141 Endowment performance in 2008 and administrators’ responses 
called into question the new endowment model, though few universities 
jettisoned it.142
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Stephanie Strom, Nonprofits Paying Price For Gamble on Finances, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at A16; Beth Healy, Harvard Ignored Warnings about 
Investments, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/ 
local/massachusetts/articles/2009/11/29/harvard_ignored_warnings_about_inv 
estments/; McDonald, Lauerman & Wee, supra note 135.
Other large endowment institutions were similarly affected. Stanford University 
intended to sell $5 billion of illiquid assets to raise cash but later pulled back because 
the markets improved or the offers were too low. Craig Karmin and Peter Lattman,
Stanford Pulls Asset Sales Off Auction Block, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, at C1. Yale 
University reduced staff, froze salaries for deans and officers, reduced the number of 
graduate students, and turned down the heat to sixty-eight degrees in order to close a 
$150 million budget deficit. Lisa W. Foderaro, Yale, With $150 Million Deficit, Plans 
Staff and Research Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.4, 2010, at A28. Cornell laid off 150 staff 
and another 432 took early retirement. Princeton University eliminated forty-three 
positions in order to reduce its operating budget by $170 million over two years. See 
infra Appendix I. Despite the recovery of Harvard’s endowment, the cutbacks have 
remained. See Jennifer Levitz, Economy Tests Harvard, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2012, at 
A3. In the fiscal year 2012, Harvard paid $345.3 million in terminating interest rate 
swaps, bringing the cost of unwinding debt derivatives to more than $1.25 billion. John 
Lauerman & Michael McDonald, Harvard University Lost $US345.3 Million 
Terminating Interest-Rate Sawps, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2013, 8:38 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-08/harvard-swap-toll-tops-1-4-billion-
ending-deals-in-2012-2013.html (“Harvard University, the world’s richest college, lost 
$345.3 million terminating interest-rate swaps last year, bringing its cost of unwinding 
debt derivatives since 2008 to more than $US1.25 billion.”).
142. Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 731; Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 22–24. 
2014] WHAT WENT WRONG: PRUDENT MANAGEMENT 231
C. Second Tier Endowments
Colleges and universities with endowments less than $1 billion used a 
modified form of the endowment model of investing, which in the good 
years did not achieve as high returns as the largest proponents of the model. 
They were unable to invest in some particularly successful hedge funds 
because the minimum capital accepted was beyond their means, or they 
would skew their portfolio allocations by placing too great a percent of 
their portfolio in illiquid assets with unacceptable levels of volatility. Some 
private equity investments may have been closed to them, or the 
endowment was unwilling or unable to tie up so much money for long 
periods and be subject to calls for more capital.
Often, they utilized investment pools such as Commonfund, an 
endowment manager for nearly 1,500 institutions offering a variety of 
funds of differing risk,143 or The Investment Fund for Foundations, which 
offers charities access to a diverse group of asset classes at relatively low 
cost.144 These endowments did not have the capacity themselves to evaluate 
outside investment managers so they retained outside experts, such as the 
Commonfund or others, to vet investment possibilities. All but the largest 
endowments have private consulting firms or supervisors of investment 
managers to monitor and steer assets into approved investment vehicles. 
This is not free advice, so returns may be reduced. Some endowments 
invested in so-called funds of funds, which also lowered possible returns.145
D. Oversight Problems and Lack of Understanding of Investments
Problems using the new endowment model of investing emerged even 
before the financial crisis. Although UPMIFA and UPIA encourage a 
delegation of investment management, a nonprofit board cannot thereafter 
abdicate its responsibility to monitor the delegates and to understand the 
nature of the investment strategy.146 Several universities failed in this 
regard. The University of Minnesota System and the University of
Minnesota Foundation reached an out-of-court settlement with a money 
But see William Jarvis, Is the Endowment Model Still Working?, 18 TRUSTEESHIP  20
(Mar.-Apr. 2010). Data in NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments in 2010 did 
not show a turning away from the endowment model, which still was able to deliver 
around 270 basis points per year of extra value.
143. About Us, COMMONFUND (Apr. 4, 2014, 10:17 PM), 
http://www.commonfund.org/ABOUTUS/Pages/default.aspx.
144. See LUIS M. VICEIRA & BRENDON C. PARRY, THE INVESTMENT FUND FOR 
FOUNDATIONS (TIFF) IN 2009 (2010).
145. A Fund of Funds (FOF) invests in other hedge and private equity, providing 
added diversification along with double fees, those of the underlying funds, and of the 
FOF.
146. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 5(3) (2006); UPIA, supra note 46, at § 9(a)(3) 
(1994).
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management firm because the firm failed to inform officials at the 
University of the risks involved in trading derivative instruments invested 
on the University’s behalf.147 DePauw University sued an investment 
advisory firm and its principals alleging that they failed to thoroughly 
investigate the hedge funds they recommended and misrepresented facts 
about them.148 Because of bad investments into alternative investments, 
poor investment advice, and a seeming ignorance of the benefits of 
diversification of endowment assets, Cooper Union ended a 110-year “no
tuition” policy and was forced to charge its students $20,000 tuition.149
The 2008 financial crisis exposed gaps in trustee oversight and generated 
litigation from charities claiming they were misled into investing in 
vehicles that were much riskier than imagined or illiquid. The University of 
Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University lost the $114 million they 
invested in Westridge Capital Management, a firm run by two individuals 
accused of using the firm as a personal piggy bank.150 It had been vetted 
with approval by consulting firms.151 The universities had relied on the 
recommendation of an outside investment consultant and were lured by the 
promise of big returns on alternative investments.152
E. Lessons Learned and Unlearned
The lessons of behavioral finance and the unexpected events of recent 
years pose challenges to the application of the MPT but do not eliminate it 
as the fundamental method for endowment investment. They do raise 
important signals concerning the need for caution and an increased 
appreciation of risk for endowment investing strategies. The answer to the 
147. Kim Strosnider, Settlement Reached at University of Minnesota, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 28, 1997, at A42.
148. The University had invested $3.25 million in one of the Bayou Group’s hedge 
funds. Bayou fabricated its returns and collapsed in 2005. See Ian McDonald, Clients 
Are Suing Hennessee Group Over Bayou Advice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15–16, 2005, at B6. 
The collapse also ensnared the Christian Brothers School of Nashville, which had 
invested $1.2 million. The bankruptcy trustee was successful in clawing back the 
redemption of that investment because the school was on notice when it redeemed that 
something was wrong at the fund. See In re Bayou Group, 396 B.R. 810 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2008).
149. James B. Stewart, How Errors in Investing Cost a College Its Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2013, at B1.
150. See Paul Fain, 2 Universities Seek Answers After $114-Million Vanishes in an 
Alleged Swindle, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 5, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/ 2-
Universities-Seek-Answers/1565/. Carnegie Mellon eventually received more than $40-
million in restitution. Andrew Mytelka, Carnegie Mellon U. Gets $40-Million Returned 
from Investment Swindle, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/carnegie-mellon-u-gets-40-million-returned-from-
investment-swindle/32389.
151. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 24.
152. See Fain, supra note 150; Mytelka, supra note 150.
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question, “what went wrong?” is the under appreciation of risk and the 
overconfidence in the ability to manage it. The MPT may only apply in 
certain markets involving particular securities.
We are living in a period of financial turbulence. Investors and markets 
have underestimated the probability of extreme volatility. Risk is greater 
and more unpredictable than the MPT posits. The MPT presumed that 
future volatility would replicate the present and the past, but recent events 
have shown that is not so, at least in the probabilities expected. In periods 
of great volatility and economic upheaval, covariance changes are much 
greater and much more unpredictable than normal. The rational actions of 
investors in normal times can collectively become irrational.153 Many 
investment vehicles used in endowment portfolios are opaque, illiquid, and 
incapable of adequate analyses of the risk, the probabilities of return, or the 
relationship between the two.
The high returns initially generated by the endowment model of 
investing disguised the limits of the MPT’s risk management techniques. 
The elegance of the theory encouraged people to believe more than it 
actually promised. The endowment model led to investments in markets 
and financial products where neither variance nor expected earnings could 
be derived with any degree of confidence. Harry Markowitz, the discoverer 
of the relationship between risk and return, seems to have stepped back 
from the extension of the theory into private placements commodities and 
beyond, “[t]hese assets . . . must be properly valued and thus, are best left 
to people like Warren Buffet or David Swenson.”154
Even after the harsh lessons of 2008, prudence and humility are in short 
supply by investment committees and their advisors. Despite the sobering 
experience of the financial crisis, large and small endowments invested 
more heavily in illiquid alternative investments in an effort to squeeze 
additional returns from the low interest rate environment.155 However, 
because of the strength of the equity markets in 2013, college and 
university endowments have cut their alternative investment allocations.156
In uncertain times, endowment investment policies should reflect a 
153. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 112 (2009).
154. Alan Lavine, Harry Markowitz Father of Modern Portfolio Still Diversified, 
101 FIN. HIST. 17, 19 (Fall 2011).
155. 2012 NCSE, supra note “4, at 6.
156. In the fiscal year 2013, the average allocation in alternative investments fell 
from 54% to 47%. NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2013 NACUBO-
COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2013) [hereinafter 2013 NCSE]. Yale reduced 
its private equity exposure to 31% for the fiscal year 2014 from 35.3 in 2012, the first 
reduction in that investment class since 2005. Michael McDonald, Colleges Cut 
Alternative Investments to Recoup Losses, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg. com/news/2013-11-06/colleges-cut-alternative-investments-to-
recoup-losses.html.
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heightened element of caution and prudence into the investing equation. 
Given the composition and dynamics of college and university boards, this 
may be difficult to achieve.
VII. GOVERNING BOARD OVERSIGHT OF INVESTMENT POLICY
Ultimately, the governing body is responsible for monitoring an 
institution’s endowment. While it is difficult to generalize about the 
composition of college and university boards, one can suggest that they 
primarily are made up of successful alumni involved in business activity, 
prominent individuals who have supported the institution, plus others who 
give representation to some of the college or university’s constituencies. 
Several trustees are likely to be involved in financial services, but that does 
not mean in and of itself they are knowledgeable about investment strategy 
or risk management.
A. Organizational Structures for Managing Endowments
The organizational structures for managing endowments differ. One 
approach is the self-standing management company with a separate board 
of trustees appointed by the college or university’s governing board and 
including some overlap of membership between the managing company’s
board and the college or university’s governing body. Examples of this 
approach include Duke (DUMAC), Harvard (Harvard Management 
Company), and Stanford (Stanford Management Company). The 
management company’s board is responsible for asset allocation decisions 
and supervision of the management company. The college or university’s
governing board ultimately controls the management company and 
determines annual endowment spending rates.157 Another model is for the 
governing board’s investment committee to oversee the committee or 
investment office that manages the endowment.158
157. Princeton illustrates this approach. Princo, the University’s management 
company, serves as the manager of over one hundred external financial managers of 
hedge funds, private equity companies, real estate, and alternative investments. 
Princo’s board of directors determines how assets are to be allocated among major 
investment categories. The twelve member board includes members of the Committee 
on Finance of Princeton’s Board of Trustees. The Committee on Finance approves the 
annual endowment spending rate and has an annual joint meeting with Princo’s Board. 
PRINCETON UNIV. OFFICE OF FINANCE AND TREASURY, ENDOWMENT 101 7 (2011), 
available at www.princeton.edu/vpsec/cpuc/. . ./2-23-2012-meeting-summary.pdf.
158. Brown, Cornell, Michigan, Penn, and Texas among many others follow this 
approach. At Yale, the Yale Corporation Investment Committee is responsible for 
oversight of the endowment and portfolio policy formulation. The Investment 
Committee consists of at least three Fellows of the Corporation and other persons with 
particular investment expertise. The Committee meets quarterly, at which time 
members review asset allocation policies, endowment performance, and strategies 
proposed by investments office staff. The Committee approves guidelines for 
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Most colleges and universities rely on external managers, such as 
Commonfund or The Investment Fund for Foundations, to invest ninety-
five to one hundred percent of their endowments.159 This figure implies that 
most endowments are passively invested with investment committees 
determining overall strategy or reaffirming the recommendations of the 
chief investment officer. The largest endowments monitor more directly the 
external managers of endowment assets, the hedge funds, and private 
equity firms.160 The board or its investment committee will select an asset 
allocation approach that satisfies the institution’s appetite for risk. The 
external investment advisory firm may manage some funds in which the 
endowment directly invests, or it may serve as an adviser and monitor of 
hedge funds and other asset vehicles making investment recommendations 
for the particular endowment.
Harvard, through the Harvard Management Company, has a unique 
hybrid approach. It directly manages approximately one-third of its 
endowment assets internally, a higher percentage by far than other 
endowments. The remainder is handled by third party managers. Harvard 
maintains that its approach is more cost effective, leading to greater returns 
for the endowment.161
B. Investment Committees
Most endowments are monitored by an investment or finance committee, 
composed of individuals experienced in finance and successful in that field. 
They have the skill set to work with college and university endowment 
staff and outside investment advisers and managers. An investment 
investment of the Endowment portfolio, specifying investment objectives, spending 
policy, and approaches for the investment of each asset category. THE YALE 
ENDOWMENT 2011 27 (2011) [hereinafter YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2011], available 
at http://www.yale.edu/investments/ Endowment_Update.pdf.
159. The 2012 NCSE study reported that the 823 institutions surveyed employed 
an average 1.6 full-time equivalent employees to manage their endowments. 2013 
NCSE, supra note 4. An outside consultant is used to manage the endowment by 81% 
of the responding institutions. Id.
160. A major staff responsibility at Yale’s Investment Office is finding and 
working with high quality external managers, or as it terms them, “partners.” The 
Investments Office’s staff meets with many prospective investment managers each 
year. It then eliminates most candidates and conducts numerous layers of due diligence 
on compelling candidates. Yale chooses to partner with managers with whom the 
University can develop long-lasting relationships. The average manager tenure in 
Yale’s portfolio is eleven years. YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 158, at 
19.
161. HARVARD MANAGEMENT CO., A UNIQUE INVESTMENT MODEL (2010), 
available at http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/.investment-management/hybrid_model.html. 
In 2010, the Harvard Management Company had an annual operating budget of $67 
million and employed approximately 180 people, including 40 investment 
professionals. Perold & Stafford, supra note 67.
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committee should bring discipline to the endowment management process 
by reviewing staff or external managers’ investment recommendations, but 
its ultimate authority yields to staff expertise. The investment committee 
manages the process, not the portfolio.162 Their monitoring is supportive, 
passive, if not nominal. They are likely to have a similar mindset with staff 
or external managers.
The investment committee or its equivalent drives board discussions of 
endowment policy. These individuals’ expertise contrasts with other board 
members and engenders a respect in their views by the latter. Investment 
professionals are likely to be self-confident individuals with a high level of 
self-esteem. They may exhibit a greater willingness to take and tolerate 
risk, believing in their ability to understand and control it, thereby 
underestimating its threat.163
Over-optimism is a common trait in the world of finance, particularly 
among successful and intelligent investment professionals. Such 
individuals are confident of their ability to navigate the financial markets. 
Successful risk-taking led to extraordinary endowment growth in the 
1990s, when double-digit increments became the norm in the largest 
endowments and encouraged increased risk taking among their smaller 
brethren. This fed into an optimistic risk culture with a payoff of great 
rewards for the endowment and for its investment advisers and 
managers.164 Investment committees became risk complacent. They may 
162. The Yale Endowment Report describes the relationship between the 
investment committee and staff:
Ideally, committees rarely exercise the power to reject staff recommendations. 
If a committee frequently turns down or revises investment proposals, the 
staff encounters difficulty in managing the portfolio. Investment opportunities 
often require negotiation of commitments subject to board approval. If the 
board withholds approval with any degree of regularity, staff loses credibility 
in the eyes of the investment management community. That said, the 
committee must provide more than a rubber stamp for staff recommendations.
YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 158, at 27. Thus, the investment 
committee is allied with endowment staff.
163. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the 
Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of 
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285–304 (2004). Recent events involving the 
supposedly best-managed American bank, JPMorganChase, show that excessive risk 
taking, lax controls, and inaccurate risk models remain alive and active on Wall Street, 
and this should provide a cautionary tale to college and university trustees. See Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/ jpmorgan-
trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Nelson D. Schwartz 
& Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Was Warned about Lax Risk Controls, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2012, at B1; Julie Steinberg and Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Models 
Get Regulatory Spotlight, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2012, at C1.
164. Langevoort, supra note 124, at 1219–20. Investment advisers at endowments 
are often paid for performance, receiving bonuses for exceeding benchmarks. This 
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have been unduly influenced by their endowment’s returns, compared with 
similarly situated competitors. The endowment derby overshadowed the 
twin endowment missions of stability and intergenerational equity and 
reinforced risk tolerance.165
C. Board Cohesion
A substantial body of literature views boards as complex social units, 
subject to the same social and psychological influences that affect such 
groups generally.166 To work effectively, boards prefer consensus, 
approval, and group solidarity. A leading criterion for board service is the 
individual’s identification and acceptance of the organization’s goals and 
methods of operation.167 Most college and university governing board 
members are alumni and share the status rewards and prestige such service 
brings. They may have professional or personal relationships among 
themselves. Cohesive boards often come from the similar social and 
economic milieus. This is not to suggest that board personalities and their 
internal dynamics do not vastly differ, but various social influences shape 
board behavior and deliberation.168
D. Deference in Decision-making
The pressures of cohesion make board oversight of endowment policy 
difficult. The endowment model of investing is complex, if not 
unfathomable to the uninitiated.169 Because of a substantial knowledge 
method of compensation encourages risk taking as it does at hedge funds and 
investment banks.
165. Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 736–37, 740.
166. Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, 
Norms, And The Unintended Consequences of Independence And Accountability, 89
GEO.L.J. 797, 810. (2001).
167. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological 
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
83, 91 (1985). Another important consideration is compatibility with other board 
members. Selection practices promote cooperation, consensus, and uniformity of view. 
Id. at 91–92.
168. Social influence refers to the phenomenon that individuals tend to conform 
their conduct to that of other individuals. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social 
Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362 (1997). Social influence shapes 
values. Individuals tend to adapt their convictions to those of their peers. Such adaption 
can occur rapidly once individuals are exposed to information about their peers’
attitudes. Id. at 358–59. This has also been termed structural bias where members of a 
board or group are favorably disposed to each other. See Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process 
Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate 
Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 286 (2012). See also Julian Velasco, Structural Bias 
and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 824–25 (2004).
169. The complexity and quantification of investment analysis hinders disclosure 
and obscures explanation and consequences (i.e. risk) even to experts; See generally
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deficit, it is difficult for board members unfamiliar with finance to pose 
questions about endowment policy. In a sense, in the matter of endowment 
investing policy, boards may be captured by the investment committee and 
the investment advisers.
Boards exhibiting a high degree of cohesion are likely to think alike. 
Such groups may be subject to a subconscious censorship of diverging 
opinions or viewpoints counter to the majority. Directors with financial 
expertise receive undue deference from other board members, which results 
in deliberations that may be empty formulaic approvals without adequate 
deliberation of alternative approaches.170 Investment policy is complex, and 
informational asymmetries between non-financial services board members 
and investment professionals compound the problem of chilling dissent.171
Non-expert directors need assistance in interpreting investment and risk 
policy, which they may not receive, and even if they do, they may not 
understand the information. A rising endowment may quiet any board 
concerns hiding the risk level of the endowment, particularly amongst 
trustees without financial expertise.
A college or university board needs to develop a culture of oversight of 
investment strategy that involves the full board and not merely the 
investment committee. Ideally, boards should have members experienced 
in risk management. That, however, is unlikely to occur.172
VIII. IMPROVING BOARD OVERSIGHT OF ENDOWMENT RISK
Risk oversight should be a governance responsibility of the board. It 
consists of the process of reviewing, assessing, and categorizing various 
types of risk to which an endowment and the institution are exposed.173
Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
211, 221–25 (2009) (discussing how complexity of modern investment securities can 
hinder disclosure and conceal consequences).
170. This has been termed “group think,” where directors place allegiance to 
fellow board members ahead of the organization’s best interests, undermining social 
norms that facilitate sound governance procedures. Melanie Leslie, The Wisdom of 
Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179 (2010). It has 
also been called “herding behavior.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group 
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 28–29, 32 (2002) 
(finding that the desire to maintain group cohesion trumps the exercise of critical 
judgment).
171. Leslie, supra note 170, at 1197.
172. The absence of board members knowledgeable about risk management is not 
limited to college and university endowments, but played a role in financial institutions 
that collapsed or needed to be bailed out during the financial crisis. See Paul Strebel, 
Time to bring real shareholders back on board, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009),
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/futur
e-envir-O-0902.pdf.
173. Risk management involves more than the financial risk of an endowment 
imploding. It includes ensuring that systems are in place to protect against occurrences 
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College and university boards should follow their corporate counterparts by 
giving risk oversight a higher profile in the governance portfolio.
The best way to involve the full governing board in evaluating the 
endowment’s risk policy would be to create a board level Risk Oversight 
Committee (“ROC”). This approach to foreseeing and managing risk is
mandated for large bank holding companies and other covered companies 
under the Dodd-Frank Act,174 and it is recommended by the Walker Report 
which reviewed corporate governance in U.K. banks and other financial 
institutions.175 It offers a possible template for college and university 
boards, for what is a college or university endowment but the institution’s
in-house bank?
Colleges and universities are increasingly complicated institutions and 
face a number of types of risk, of which endowment volatility is but one.
The NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE) 2013 
preliminary data shows that even after the events of 2008, colleges and 
universities seem not very concerned with endowment risk.176 For the first 
time, the NCSE 2013 survey will publish information about risk oversight 
that put the institution’s reputation in peril as well as strategic planning on how to deal 
with such events. For example, planning on how to prevent and respond to catastrophic 
events that may damage the institution: scandals, shootings, fires, and similar tragedies. 
There is an overlap obviously with the audit functions of installing reporting systems, 
but risk oversight would include crisis management scenarios. This article deals with 
financial risks, but recognizes that is but one part of the risk oversight portfolio.
174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 165(3), 124 Stat. 1375, 1423–32 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) 
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1)(A)(iii) for the risk 
management standards. On December 11, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board requested 
comments on a proposed rule to implement the requirements of § 165. See Enhanced 
Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies: 
Proposed Rules Request for Comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 594-663 (Jan. 5, 2012), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-01-05/pdf/2011-33364.pdf. The New York 
Stock Exchange requires listed companies to provide disclosure about their risk 
oversight practices including information about the board’s role in managing risk. See
N.Y. Stock Exchange Listed Companies Manual § 303A.07(b)(i)(1).
175. DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.K. BANKS AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES (2009), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ 
walker_review_261109.pdf.. Recommendations twenty-three through twenty-seven 
deal with the governance of risk. Id. at 19–20. The report recommended that banks or 
life insurance companies should establish a board risk committee separate from the 
audit committee, which should have responsibility for oversight and advice to the board 
on current risk exposures of the entity and future risk strategy. Id. at 19. The board 
should have a chief risk officer, who would participate at the highest level on an 
enterprise-wide basis and report to the board risk committee. Id. The risk committee’s
activities should be included as a separate report within the annual report. Id. at 20.
176. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2013 NCSE PRELIMINARY 
RELEASE (2013), available at http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/
2013NCSEPreliminaryPressRelease.pdf [hereinafter 2013 NCSE Preliminary Release].
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by endowments.177 The preliminary data indicates that forty-five percent of 
participating institutions employ risk limits on their portfolio, while thirty-
three percent do not.178 Sixty-nine percent of those using risk limits use 
volatility calculations, and fifty-four percent use measures such as 
alpha/beta analysis; thirty-nine percent use stress testing or scenario 
analysis.179 These are surprisingly low figures, indicating that when boards 
delegate their endowment investment strategy to outside managers, many 
do not oversee the risks in their portfolios beyond making a decision on 
allocation of investment classes.180
Endowment risk oversight is not usually carried out by a separate board 
committee; rather, it is delegated to one of the existing standing 
committees: investment, finance, or more likely, audit. There is debate in 
the corporate world whether financial risk functions should reside in the 
audit committee’s portfolio. An initial question is whether the audit 
committee has the time, the skills, and the support to accomplish the job 
effectively, given its other substantial responsibilities.181 In a sense, 
auditing differs from risk oversight in that the former deals with past 
activities and the latter focuses on future events—i.e. how to channel and 
protect against the occurrence of unwanted possibilities and to strategize 
how to deal with such events.
The actual calculation of endowment risk is conducted by risk managers, 
who may be a part of a risk-management department or group within the 
college or university’s investment management company or its external 
investment advisors. Risk managers assess and measure the risks facing an 
institution as a result of its investing activities, monitor the risks for 
change, determine whether the institution has the resources to deal with the 
risk, and alert senior management and the board about risk issues.182
177. Id.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id.
180. For an excellent introduction to risk management and its failures in financial 
institutions leading to the 2008 financial crisis, see James Fanto, Anticipating the 
Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in Finance and Environmental 
Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 735–36 (2009). See infra, note 182 for 
definitions of some methods for evaluating endowment risk.
181. The Conference Board’s experience is that corporations that lodge risk 
oversight in the audit committee have vastly differing views of what that responsibility 
entails and their scope is all over the map. Additionally, the “audit committee financial 
expert,” mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, may not have the skills necessary for evaluating 
and assessing risk. CAROL BEAUMIER & JIM DELOACH, RISK OVERSIGHT: SHOULD 
YOUR BOARD HAVE A SEPARATE RISK COMMITTEE? (2012), available at
http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V4N1-
12.pdf&type=subsite.
182. See Fanto, supra note 180, at 735–36. Financial risk assessment includes both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitative tools use models based on statistical 
measures to quantify the possibilities of loss based on past investments and financial 
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Whichever board committee is responsible for risk oversight, it should 
understand and identify all risks facing the institution, ensure that
appropriate limits are in place for financial investments, and evaluate the 
institution’s risk management framework, compliance limits, and reporting 
systems. It should attempt to protect the institution against catastrophic 
loss, prepare for minimizing such losses, and evaluate the impact of such 
losses on the institution’s constituencies.183 If a board level risk oversight 
committee is created, it might develop policies and parameters for investing 
in particularly risky vehicles, which would be approved by the full board. 
As with other board committees, the ROC would work closely with 
external risk management firms retained to advise the committee.184
CONCLUSION
Decisions concerning a prudent or suitable level of risk for a particular 
endowment should be reached only after thoughtful consideration of the 
fund’s purposes and the institution’s tolerance of volatility of return. The 
exposures. The most common is value at risk (“VaR”), which produces an 
approximation of worst case scenarios by assessing at different confidence degrees the 
minimum values of assets in the future. VaR provides an estimate of how much can be 
lost in a single day. Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About The Money: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial 
Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 435–36 (2013). A problem with VaR is that it is 
based on historical data about past investment performance and the assumption that 
future deviations will follow a bell curve distribution. As with all quantitative 
approaches, the quality of the inputted data affects the quality of the output. See
generally Edwards, supra note 129; Johnson, supra note 129.
Other techniques of risk assessment are stress testing and scenario analysis, which 
have a more qualitative focus because they assess potential losses caused by adverse 
situations and evaluate how the endowment would respond. Fanto, supra note 180, at 
737. Stress testing is a procedure for evaluating the potential loss of a portfolio due to 
underlying risk factors over a wide range of scenarios of risk, including those of very 
low probability. Scenario analysis analyzes future events that result in a wide variety of 
outcomes that would be unfavorable to the endowment’s value. Essentially, stress 
testing and scenario analysis are forward-looking economic assessments that evaluate 
whether the institution, in this case an endowment, is strong enough to endure difficult 
economic conditions. Patkin, supra note 182, at 479. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 9–
11 (2009), available at http:// www.bis.org/publ/bcbs147.pdf (discussing stress testing 
methodologies).
183. Cf. Packin, supra note 182, at 439.
184. It is unlikely that board members will be experts in risk assessment, but the 
board committee should have access to internal risk management officials and would 
retain external risk management experts to advise it and to work with the endowment’s
chief risk officer. The use of outside experts to assist board committees is a common 
practice. Audit committees retain accounting firms and consultants. Nominating 
committees often retain search firms to find board candidates. Compensation 
committees retain compensation consultants, and investment committees delegate their 
responsibilities to outside advisers and managers.
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appropriate level of risk should not be determined merely by financial 
theories, general legal principles, or blind confidence in board members’
expertise in finance. Rather, it should be determined through an informed 
consensus of the whole governing body as to which types of investments 
are suitable for the endowment’s purposes and will give a sufficient 
measure of comfort that the mission of the fund will be achieved.185
This article does not suggest that institutions should abandon the 
endowment model of investing or the Modern Portfolio Theory, or that any 
specific level of endowment risk is appropriate or not. It merely 
recommends that there should be deliberation of the institution’s risk 
tolerance by the full board. Recognition of Justice Putnam’s warning in 
Harvard College v. Amory, “[d]o what you will, the capital is at hazard,”186
and the realization of the consequences of assuming too much risk are 
likely to lead to more measured results, rather than a blind adherence to the 
endowment model of investing and increased returns.
185. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3(e)(1) (2006) (contains a list of steps that fund 
trustees should engage in when determining their risk level).
186. Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 468 (1830). See discussion supra Part 
II.
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APPENDIX I: UNIVERSITY BUDGET CUTS AND AUSTERITY EFFORTS
University Cuts and Reductions*
Boston 
College
Pay freeze on all staff making more than $75,000.1
Unspecified number of unfilled positions eliminated.1
Delayed construction of a science complex.1
Boston 
University
51 persons laid off.1
200 positions eliminated.1
Hiring freeze in place since 2008.1
Halt of $130 million in new construction projects.1
250 lay-offs at affiliated BU School of Medicine.1
Brandeis Over 82 lay-offs.1
Attempted closure of the Rose Art Museum and sale of 
its 6,000 pieces. Value approximated at $350 million.1
Dartmouth Laid off or eliminated 275 staff positions.1
Reduced hours for 107 employees.1
Encouraged 105 early retirements.1
Imposed a 2010 hiring freeze.1
Delay of renovations for 5 years.1
Postponement of new construction.1
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Harvard 310 persons laid off.1
530 early retirements.1
103 persons had their hours reduced.1
Suspension of initiative to expand into Allston,**
resulting in postponement of expected jobs, stalled 
economic development, idle use of land. The project was 
expected to create 14,000-15,000 jobs over the next 50 
years.1
275 employees laid-off; others forced to early 
retirement.2
Cut hot breakfasts in undergraduate dining halls.2
Cut undergraduate academic advising.2
Cut student employment opportunities at university 
libraries.2
Suspended university’s expansion into Allston.2
Cut staff hours at university libraries.2
Cut primary care division at university hospitals.2
Cut shuttle service for students at distant dorms.2
Cut funding for undergraduate dorms.2
Increased section sizes.2
Suspended annual conferences.2
Cancelled program that waived 3rd year tuition for law 
students that met community service requirements and 
pledged to go into public service.3
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MIT 135 staff laid off.1
Unquantified others have had their hours reduced.1
5% budget reductions in 2009; and 10-15% for the 
following three years.2
Delayed renovations to undergraduate dorms.2
Salary freeze for highest-compensated faculty.2
Increase in student fees.2
Closed two branches of the library.2
30-50% reduction of admissions outreach travel 
spending.2
Elimination of eight athletic teams.2
Princeton Salary freezes for the best-compensated faculty and 
staff.2
A freeze on construction.2
Reduction or elimination of scholarly activities not 
related to teaching and research, including “certain 
outside conferences and colloquia.”2
Reductions in undergraduate research opportunities.2
Reductions in graduate funding in the humanities.2
“Dramatic” reduction in campus civic engagement 
funding.2
Reductions in outreach-related admissions travel.2
Stanford Budget cuts across the university by 12-15%.2
12% reduction in staff size at the Graduate School of 
Business including: cuts to travel, food, library services, 
marketing activities, printing expenses.2
Hiring freezes for forty-nine ongoing staff searches.2
Leaving faculty vacancies unfilled.2
University layoffs of 350 administrative positions.2
“Dramatic” reductions in undergraduate peer advising.2
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Yale Overall budget reduction of 5%; later raised to 7.5%.2
Suspension of capital projects for its business school, 
museum, science building, and undergraduate dorms.2
Reduced hours for some student and permanent 
employees.2
20% cuts to undergraduate government.2
Reduction of library digitization projects.2
* All employment figures are subject to revision.
** Economic Impacts of Harvard’s Allston Delays: Direct Earnings Loss is 
approximated at ~$90,000,000 per delayed year; Total Regional Economic Loss is 
approximated at ~$285,000,000 per delayed year.
1. Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, Educational Endowments and the 
Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic Risks in the Shadow Banking System
(2011).
2. Peter Conti-Brown, Scarcity Amidst Wealth: The Law, Finance, and Culture of 
Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis, 63 STAN. L. REV. 699 (2011).
3.Jennifer Levitz, Economy Tests Harvard—-Elite Universities See Recession’s Toll on
Endowments, Pinching Operating Costs, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2012, at A3.
